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SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROVING
SELF-DEFENSE - WITH ANALYSIS OF
RELATED OHIO LAW
S ENATE BILL NUMBER 42 was introduced into the Ohio General Assembly
on February 1, 1977. The bill provides that while the burden of proof
for all elements of the criminal offense with which an individual is charged
rests upon the prosecution, the burden of proof for affirmative defenses
rests upon the defendant, and he must prove his affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.' Because the bill raises serious questions
concerning placing the burden of persuasion with respect to affirmative
defenses generally, and self-defense in particular, on the defendant, a study
of the law and policy involved in shifting the burden to the defendant on
these defenses is warranted.2
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Robinson,3 recently held
that self-defense was an affirmative defense requiring the burden of going
forward to be imposed on the defendant.' In Robinson, the defendant was
charged with aggravated murder in connection with the shooting death of
his nephew. He introduced evidence tending to show that the deceased had
previously made threats upon his life and that, on the day in question, the
deceased had come to his home intoxicated and created an altercation be-
tween himself and the defendant. Further evidence suggested that the de-
fendant had gone upstairs in his home to get a gun and had returned with
it, shooting the deceased in the head.' The defendant pled self-defense and
the lower court instructed the jury that the defendant bore the burden of
proving his defense by a preponderance of the evidence.' The Supreme
Court of Ohio held on appeal that the instruction was in error based upon
a reading of Ohio Revised Code section 2901.05(A) which provides:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven
S.B. No. 42, 112th G.A. (1977-78). The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee
on February 2, 1977.
2 Subpart C of the bill, id., states:
(C) As used in this section, an "affirmative defense" is either of the following:
(1) A defense expressly designated as affirmative;
(2) A defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge
of the accused, on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting
evidence.
3 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
4 The determination that self-defense was an affirmative defense was based on a reading of
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (C) (Page 1975), which includes exactly the same word-
ing as subpart C of S.B. No. 42 (see note 2 supra for text of bill).
5 47 Ohio St. 2d at 105, 351 N.E.2d at 90.
Old. at 106, 351 N.E.2d at 91.
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden of proof is upon the
prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an
affirmative defense is upon the accused."
The court ultimately concluded that the instruction was in error because
the defendant did not bear the burden of proving self-defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence under the statute as construed by the court."
The significance of the decision becomes apparent when the ambiguous
concept of "burden of proof" is analyzed in detail. The term embraces two
separate burdens of proof. The first is the burden of producing evidence,
satisfactory to the judge, to bring a particular fact into issue. This is the
burden of "going forward."' Normally the burden of going forward is
critical to the defendant who wishes to avoid a directed verdict, since the
mere production of significant evidence will create some doubt as to the
certainty of the opponent's case. However, because of the presumption of
innocence existing in criminal trials and the heavy burden of persuasion
on the prosecution, a directed verdict for the prosecution is unlikely to
occur."0 Nonetheless, the burden of going forward is still critical for the
defendant if he wants an issue on which he bears the burden to be consid-
ered by the jury. He may either present some evidence bearing upon the
issue which will be weighed by the jury along with the evidence produced
by the prosecution in rebuttal, or he may rely upon the evidence contained
in the adversary's case itself if it raises the issue." In either case, once the
burden of going forward is satisfied, the issue will be considered by the
jury without any instruction as to the satisfaction of the burden.12 If the
' OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (A) (Page 1975).
S 47 Ohio St. 2d at 113, 351 N.E.2d at 94-95.
9 W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CiumNAL LAw § 8, at 45 (1972); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §
336, at 783-84 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafted cited as MCCORMICK] See generally Thayer, The
Burden of Proof, 4 H.Iv. L. REV. 45 (1890).
10 There are also serious constitutional questions involved with directed verdicts in criminal
cases. If the defendant has a sixth amendment right to trial by jury, he is arguably deprived
of that right if a verdict in favor of the prosecution is rendered by the judge. If his only option
is to produce some evidence by going forward, then his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination may be violated, especially where the defense is a "confession and avoidance"
type, such as self-defense or entrapment. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2495 (3d ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as WiGMORE].
"1 See, e.g., People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526, 528-29, 260 N.E.2d 527, 528, 311 N.Y.S.2d
889, 891 (1970). For a discussion of the quantum of evidence required to satisfy the burden
of going forward, see F. JAMES, & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.11, at 272 (1965); 9
WIOMORE, supra note 10, at § 2494.
12 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Prac-
tices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 904 (1968). Once the burden is satisfied, the
jury must be instructed concerning the particular elements of the defense. State v. Robinson,
47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976). However, whether the defendant has met the
burden of going forward is exclusively the court's concern.
(Vol. 11:4
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judge determines that the defendant has been successful in tendering his
defense, the resulting consequence of the action, whether it be exoneration
from guilt or only mitigation of the applicable penal sanctions, will depend
upon the jurisdiction's law as applied by the jury to the facts.
Conceptually, the burden of persuasion is no more complex, although
its application has generated serious difficulties in the area of criminal juris-
prudence during the last ten years. The burden of persuasion requires the
party on whom it is placed to convince the trier of fact that the facts he
is alleging are true. The burden operates only if the parties have already
sustained their burdens of producing evidence and only after all the evidence
in the case has been introduced." If one party bears only the burden of
production on an issue, once he has satisfied that burden the opposing party
must persuade the jury by the appropriate degree of proof either that the
facts alleged do not exist or that, if they do exist, they do not support the
legal conclusion the party would have the jury draw. When the same party
bears both the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion, the
distinction between the burdens loses vitality because, in any event, the
party must meet the latter burden. It has even been argued that, in practicality,
the party bearing only the burden of going forward must meet the burden
of persuasion if his argument is to have an effect on the jury,' but this
argument, like many others, stems from the frailty of human nature in
operating a just legal system rather than the construction of the judicial
system itself.
In placing just the burden of going forward on the defendant with
respect to his plea of self-defense, the Robinson court left an easier burden
on the defendant than the trial court had. Yet, the issue of how heavy the
defendant's burden should be to prove self-defense has not been finally
resolved in the State of Ohio, as the pendency of Senate Bill Number 42
clearly indicates. Although the Ohio Supreme Court has, subsequent to
Robinson, based its decisions in allocating the burden of proof upon statu-
18 McCoamicK, supra note 9, § 336, at 783-84. See State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St. 2d 206, 371
N.E.2d 831 (1977), a confusing opinion in which the court stated that although neither
defendant nor the prosecution bore the burden of producing evidence of mitigating circum-
stances in a mitigation hearing, "the defendant only bears the risk of nonpersuasion." id.
at 216, 371 N.E.2d at 837.
14 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 337, at 784, provides: "Juries disregard their instructions on
this question and judges, trying cases without juries, pay only lip service to it, trusting that
the appellate courts will not disturb their findings of fact. . . A risk of nonpersuasion
naturally exists anytime one person attempts to persuade another to act or not to act."
McCormick concedes, however, that the problem in jury trials may not be the confusing
nature of the burdens themselves, but the confusing nature of the jury instructions required.
This problem is discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 152-83.
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tory grounds,1" decisions by the United States Supreme Court suggest that
consideration of statutory wording is not the only consideration which is
relevant in light of the fourteenth amendment Due Process Clause. The
considerations appear to be much wider, concentrating upon the justice
and fairness of the criminal judicial system rather than any arbitrary test
based on the way the state legislature has defined the crime.
It is the purpose of this work, then, to examine the standard currently
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in allocating the burden of
proof between the state and the defendant in criminal prosecutions, to un-
cover the various considerations that do or should affect the operation of
that standard, and then to apply that standard to the concept of self-defense
in Ohio. It is submitted that only through such an analysis can a decision
be reached as to whether a defendant in Ohio can properly be made to bear
the burden of persuasion on the issue of self-defense.
I. BURDEN ALLOCATION BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. In re Winship
The requirement that the prosecution bear the burden of proving de-
fendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has long been recognized as a
basic tenet of American jurisprudence.1" However, the first recognition that
the requirement was constitutionally mandated appeared in a relatively
recent case, In re Winship." Winship concerned a twelve year-old boy sus-
pected of entering a locker and stealing $112 from a woman's pocket book.
A judge in the New York Family Court had ruled that section 744(b) of
the New York Family Court Act did not require that the juvenile's guilt
be established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the determination of
guilt could be made on a preponderance of the evidence.18 After studying
the justification for section 744(b), the Supreme Court held that the due
process standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be applied to
juvenile proceedings, based on the fact that in such proceedings, "the issue
is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the
loss of his liberty for years [and this] is comparable in seriousness to a
15 State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (allocating burden of
proving insanity). See also State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977)
(allocating burden in mitigation hearing subsequent to guilt determination process).
16 The constitutional basis of the rule has been assumed in the cases coming before the Court
prior to 1970. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Osenbaugh, The
'Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429, 438
(1976).
17 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18 N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 744(b) (McKinney 1975) § 744(b) states that "[any] deter-
mination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts
must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." 397 U.S. at 360.
[Vol. 11:4
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felony prosecution."' 9 Finally, the Court focused on the advantages of
placing the reasonable doubt burden on the prosecution and noted that
there would be a reduction of convictions based upon factual error and a
fostering of respect for the criminal justice system."
Winstip has been the subject of a great number of commentaries, not
only because of the impact of applying the reasonable doubt standard to
juvenile proceedings which differ from ordinary criminal proceedings be-
cause of their parens patriae character,"' but also because of the Court's
lack of clarity in explaining the parameters of the burden to be placed on
the prosecution. While Winship has been cited as authority for the proposi-
tion that the "reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required and
extends to every element of the offense with which a defendant is charged,"'"
the language from which this rule is derived is not so clear. The explicit
holding of the Court is "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."2 There
is no precise similarity between the elements of a crime, or the facts of the
crime as defined by statute, and the facts necessary to constitute that crime,
which include the facts negating defenses to or in mitigation of criminal
liability. Concededly, the prosecution might bear a much heavier burden
if forced to prove all the facts necessary to constitute the crime. However, the
Winship Court did not define what it meant by a "fact" of the crime in-
volved.
Subsequent cases have indicated the pitfalls involved in construing "fact"
as meaning only those facts defined by statute as "elements" of the crime
as well as the pitfalls in construing the term with the broadest possible
scope. If the language is construed narrowly, then the Winship rule will be
reduced to a nullity by the possibility that a state legislature could arbitrarily
define the elements of an offense and, consequently, remove the reasonable
"9 397 U.S. at 366. The court relied heavily on In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which it said
"rendered untenable much of the reasoning relied upon . . . to sustain the constitutionality
of § 744(b)." 397 U.S. at 365. The Court in Gault held that the requirements of due process,
the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination applied to a juvenile proceeding
where a complaint alleged that a fifteen-year-old boy had made lewd phone calls.
20 397 U.S. at 363-64. The Court recognized that the court of appeals had erred in finding
only a "tenuous difference" between the reasonable doubt and preponderance standards since
the trial court judge had admitted that he might not be able to reach the same verdict of
guilt given a harsher standard. Id. at 367.
21 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 173-74.
22 Case Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Rea-
sonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARv. Cvm RiGHTS REV. 390 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Unburdening the Criminal Defendant].
23397 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
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doubt burden on those issues from the prosecution's shoulders at will.' If
the language is construed more widely to place the burden on the prose-
cution of proving all the facts of the crime, then the state must also bear
the burden of proving the nonexistence of all facts which could be recog-
nized as exculpatory or mitigating circumstances affecting the degree of
culpability or severity of the punishment.
However, many states have placed the burden of proving "mitigating"
facts, or those facts affecting only culpability, upon the defendant, and the
Supreme Court recently recognized that the legislature can shift the burden
in circumstances where the fact in mitigation might be too difficult for
the state to prove. In Patterson v. New York, 5 the Court announced: "To
recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to
prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in
its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too in-
accurate."2 The only logical conclusion is that a "fact" for Winship pur-
poses is some undefined concept in the middle ground between those facts
constituting "elements" of the crime and all other facts necessary to constitute
the crime. If Winship is to be recognized as setting a valid standard for
placement of the burden of proof, the prosecutor's burden of proving all
"facts" of a crime must be more clearly defined in order to achieve mean-
ingful and consistent application of the Winship holding.
The failure to elaborate on the test set out in Winship could be justified
by the theory that an extensive definition of what constituted a "fact" of
the crime was unnecessary at that time. The Court recognized in Irvine v.
California"7 that "[t]he chief burden of administering criminal justice rests
upon the state courts."2 The Irvine Court discussed the reluctance to apply
the exclusionary rule to the states under Wolf v. Colorado" because "thirty-
one states were not following the federal rule excluding illegally obtained
evidence, while sixteen were in agreement with it," illustrating the Supreme
Court's desire to allow the states a certain degree of discretion in criminal
24 The courts have ordinarily recognized the ability of the legislature to define elements
of the crime. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), where the Court refused to inter-
fere with a legislative determination that the crime of public drunkenness could be com-
mitted even by a chronic alcoholic. The state was not required to except chronic alcoholics
from the statute.
2 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See infra notes 54-88 and accompanying text.
26 432 U.S. at 209.
27 347 U.S. 128 (1934).
28 Id. at 134. In Irvine, petitioner was convicted of horse race bookmaking on the basis of
evidence obtained by illegal entries into his home. The Supreme Court held that the con-
viction did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
29 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
[Vol. 11:4
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matters. 30 Particularly in the realm of juvenile affairs, where the state's
function could be characterized more as parens patriae rather than as im-
partial arbiter, the Winship Court may have felt a certain reluctance to
straitjacket the states by defining the burden to be placed on the juvenile
courts.31 The ambiguous test set out in Winship had a double impact, how-
ever, for it also permitted the judiciary to intervene into the substantive
criminal law of the states through interpretation of the Winship test.
B. Mullaney v. Wilbur
The first Supreme Court case to consider the matter was Mullaney
v. Wilbur,"2 and the Court described the Winship test in the following way:
The rationale [of Winship] requires an analysis that looks to the "oper-
ation and effect of the law as applied and enforced by the State,"..
and to the interests of both the State and the defendant as affected
by the allocation of the burden of proof. 3
Mullaney was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the Court was asked
to consider the trial judge's instruction to the jury that Maine law recog-
nized two kinds of homicide, murder and manslaughter, and that while the
prosecution was required to prove the common elements of unlawfulness
and intention beyond a reasonable doubt, only if these elements were so
proven was the jury to consider the distinction between murder and man-
slaughter. The judge further instructed that if unlawfulness and intention were
proven, malice aforethought, the distinguishing element between murder
and manslaughter, was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant
proved by a fair preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation.3" Respondent contended that malice aforethought was an "ele-
ment" distinguishing murder from manslaughter, and that on its narrowest
interpretation, Winship required the prosecution to prove the element be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this
contention and stated that in Maine murder and manslaughter were not
separate crimes, but different degrees of the "single generic offense of fel-
onious homicide," and that the presumption of malice made a difference
30 347 U.S. at 134.
31 The Court in Gault indicated that a parental relationship was not an invitation to "pro-
cedural arbitrariness," but it qualified this statement with this statement from Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966): "We do not mean... to indicate that the hearing to be
held must conform with all the requirements of criminal trial or even of the usual adminis-
trative hearing, but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due
process and fair treatment." 387 U.S. at 30.
32421 U.S. 684 (1975).
1 3d. at 700. The Mullaney Court also added a new term to the two already suggested by
Winship, "critical fact in dispute." See text accompanying note 44 infra.
341 d. at 686-87.
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only to the degree of the offense.3" Therefore, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court deemed it permissible to place the burden of persuasion as to heat of
passion on the defendant.
The Supreme Court of the United States did not reject the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of its statute, but it did reject the
conclusion that the burden of persuasion to prove heat of passion could
be shifted to the defendant. In the opinion by Justice Powell, speaking for
a unanimous court, the Justice traced the defense of heat of passion from
its inception to 1975 and found that the defense had not only been the
single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability at-
taching to unlawful homicide since the formulation of the common law
concept of homicide itself, but that the law had progressively worked
toward requiring the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden on the issue.3"
The Court then stated that the Maine rule did not comport with due
process requirements.
Justice Powell found that the interests deemed vital in Winship, namely
the reduction of the threat of erroneous convictions resulting from factual
errors and the encouraging of respect for the criminal justice system, were
endangered by Maine's allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant."'
Justice Powell believed the protection of an individual against an erroneous
conviction for a crime of a higher degree than warranted was equal in
importance to protection of an innocent individual against a wholly wrongful
conviction. He stated with respect to the procedure approved by the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court:
Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence
when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves
35 Id. at 689. However, murder and manslaughter had been defined in two separate provisions
of the Maine Criminal Code. The murder statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a
human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and
shall be punished by imprisonment for life." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1954)
(repealed 1975).
Maine's manslaughter statute provided in relevant part: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human
being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice
aforethought... shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or by imprisonment
for not more than 20 years...." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2551 (1961) (repealed
1975).
36 421 U.S. at 693-97. The importance of this commentary cannot be understated. The con-
curring opinion in the recent case of Farrell v. Czarnetzky, 566 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1977),
illustrates that the courts may turn to the historical analysis as the sole guide in deciding
whether to apply the Mullaney decision or the later Patterson opinion to the circumstances
at bar.
37 421 U.S. at 700-01. See text accompanying note 20 supra. In the later case of Hankerson
v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Mullaney was to be
applied retroactively because the Maine procedures "substantially" impaired the court's truth-
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a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result in a society
where ... it is far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as
a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser crime of man-
slaughter.3 8
Justice Powell's majority opinion concentrated upon the consequences of
wrongful conviction, the resulting stigma and impairment of personal liberty,
and found that these interests also existed when an individual was forced to
prove he had acted in the heat of passion to reduce the punishment for
his crime. Therefore, the policy presumption that the defendant should
bear the burden of proving the mitigating factor of heat of passion on
sudden provocation was found constitutionally objectionable and Mullaney
expanded due process requirements to include facts that mitigate the pun-
ishment as well as the statutory "elements" of the crime."
The Mullaney decision creates many problems. Mullaney does not
provide a clear standard by which to determine whether there is one statu-
tory crime with a range of punishments or whether several crimes exist
with each crime carrying its own punishment. This distinction is important,
for if Mullaney does reject the "elements" approach, it only does so by
going beyond that approach."0 If a fact is an element, the prosecution bears
the burden of persuasion even under Mullaney. By failing to determine
what made the Maine murder-manslaughter statute a statutory crime with
a range of punishments, the United States Supreme Court left open the
possibility that proof of lack of malice may not have been merely a "miti-
gating factor," but an element of the crime of murder subject to the narrow
Winship test. Thus, it is possible that the state's determination as to whether
there exists a single statutory crime will be the sole determinant in deciding
whether to apply the Mullaney "mitigation" rule or the Winship "elements"
rule. If the state determines that there is only one statutory crime, then the
court must balance the interests involved to decide on whom the burden
should be placed. If there are two crimes, each carrying its own punishment,
then the pure "elements" approach of Winship offers neither the opportunity
38 421 U.S. at 703-04 (emphasis in original). At the extremes, the defendant in Mullaney
faced either a nominal fine or life imprisonment, depending on whether he satisfied the
burden imposed upon him. 421 U.S. at 700.
3 This constituted a rejection of the "elements" approach which focused solely upon the
statutory elements as defined by the state legislature to determine burden allocation. See
Comment, 51 ST. JoHN's LAW REV. 158, 169 (1976).
4 0 The Mullaney decision suggests that the reasonable doubt standard should apply not only
to statutory elements of the offense, but to mitigating or exculpating facts. The Court's
language reads: "Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime
as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought
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nor the necessity for the reviewing courts to balance the interests of the
state against those of the individual. "1
Secondly, while Mullaney seems to reject the narrow "elements" inter-
pretation of the Winship holding, unless the statutory scheme is to determine
on whom the burden of persuasion is to be placed, the courts are free to
use other and more discretionary bases to allocate the burden.4 2 This sug-
gests that Mullaney fills the no-man's-land between the narrow and liberal
interpretations of Winship, in this instance, with the test of whether the
fact upon which the defendant had the burden bore significantly on punish-
ment or culpability. It has been suggested by others that the Mullaney
opinion goes even further and adopts the liberal approach of Winship
requiring that the state bear the burden of establishing the defendant's
complete culpability by disproving all exculpatory or mitigating defenses
the accused raises. 3 This contention may be supported by the language used
by the Court, for the Court states that the prosecution must bear the burden
of proving.., the critical fact in dispute."" Although this language requires
a new test to determine what constitutes a "critical fact," it is arguable
that any exculpatory or mitigating defense may be critical to the extent it
affects any subsequent punishment by the state.
Under a narrow reading of Mullaney, the Supreme Court continues
the "elements" approach, allowing the federal court faced with the issue
to determine on a "functional" basis what are "elements" of the particular
crime and what are not."5 Since the opinion stresses that "substance" should
predominate over "form," ' it can be argued that Mullaney merely requires
the courts faced with the problem to question whether the fact in question
really is an element. If this is true, the Court was not merely advocating a
balancing type approach once a mitigating factor was found, but was ad-
vocating the balancing approach to determine if the mitigating factor really
was an element such that the defendant's burden should be placed on the
prosecution. Given this interpretation, it would not matter whether the
state court determined that its statute represented one crime with a series
of punishments (in which case the perceived defense was only in mitigation
of the crime) or two separable crimes (in which case the defense was
41 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court had already determined that the murder and man-
slaughter statutes did not refer to separate crimes and either as a matter of constitutional
authority or as a matter of comity, or a mixture of the two, the Mullaney Court did not
discuss the issue. 421 U.S. at 691. See Osenbaugh, supra note 16, at 444 n.94.
42 See Unburdening the Criminal Defendant, supra, note 22, at 395.
43 ld. at 398.
44421 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added).
45 Osenbaugh, supra note 16, at 446.
4 "421 U.S. at 700.
[Vol. 11:4
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essential to disproving an element of the crime). In either case, the Supreme
Court determined that proof of the mitigating factor of heat of passion was
proof of the nonexistence of an element of the crime."
It has at least been speculated that Mullaney portends the invalidation
of the defenses of insanity, entrapment, and withdrawal from conspiracy 8
as well as the elimination of all other defenses 9 from the criminal law.
However, in the few cases decided since Mullaney, the courts have not
expanded upon that theory. In at least two cases,"0 courts have relied upon
Mullaney to hold unconstitutional statutory provisions requiring defendants
to bear the burden of persuasion with regard to "extreme emotional distress"
in mitigating murder to manslaughter. But in other cases,"' the defendant has
been made to bear the burden of persuasion on a particular defense because
the defense did not negate an element of the crime.
At least one argument which may be used to restrict expansion of
the Mullaney rule is the following logic:
That a state may choose to permit a person to mitigate the harshness
of a penalty upon proof of some fact would seem to be irrevelant to
the constitutionality of the legislative scheme if the Constitution would
permit the greater penalty to be imposed regardless of the existence
of that fact.5"
The "greater includes the lesser" to which this argument is similar, has been
47 This interpretation seems to conflict with the Mullaney Court's refusal to adopt a different
construction of the statute from that adopted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which
resulted in the holding that malice was not an element of the crime of murder. See note 41
supra. However, the Mullaney Court is merely stating that although in form malice is not
an element of the crime, in substance it is and the state court determination is inefficacious.
4 sSee Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 645-56, 349 A.2d 300, 307 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975),
afl'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976) in which the court stated:
Mullaney v. Wilbur will render unconstitutional: 1) A presumption... placing upon
a defendant an ultimate burden of persuasion, by any standard of proof, on any issue
.... This ruling applies... to such defenses as: a. Any theory of justification. .. b. Any
theory of excuse...c. Any theory of mitigation ... d. Intoxication. e. Entrapment.f. Duress or coercion. g. Necessity.
Id. at 645-46, 349 A.2d at 307 (emphasis in original).
49 Mullaney may also invalidate all "affirmative defenses." As will be shown later, "affirmative
defense" is a label sometimes used by states in referring to any defense which mitigates
culpability or exculpates the defendant, and on which he bears the burden of proof. See note
98 infra.
5 0 Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d 1 (Del. 1975); People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.
2d 384, 372 (1975). The statutory provisions in each case bore substantial similarity to the
provisions ruled unconstitutional in Mullaney.
51 Grace v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 669, 217 S.E.2d 267 (1975) (ruling on the issue of insanity);
Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del. 1976) (ruling on the issue of insanity); Cowart v.
State, 221 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. App. 1975) (concerning abandonment).
5 2 Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, The Supreme Court and the Substantive Criminal Law-An
Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 Tax L. REv. 269, 285 (1977).
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rejected on a number of grounds.5" The rule, in essence, states that if the
legislature can constitutionally criminalize conduct by providing a penalty
for that conduct, it is constitutional for the legislature to structure defenses
to that crime as it chooses and provide penalties for less culpable conduct.
There is no reason the rule should not apply if the lesser penalties are
themselves constitutional, i.e., if each of the considerations of the Winship
test, community confidence in the judicial system, stigmatization, and
liberty-deprivation interests, are affected favorably.5" But to determine wheth-
er the lesser punishment was constitutional in Mullaney, the Court utilized
a comparative approach, comparing the effect of punishment of the lesser
offense with the punishment of the greater. Conceivably, a court could
analyze the lesser punishment in isolation when determining if it is con-
stitutional, viewing the state's power to offer a particular defense and
lesser punishment to the crime without studying the original crime and its
defenses in detail. The resulting analysis would almost invariably allow
the state to cast the burden on the defendant, since the mere offering of
the defense or mitigation could be viewed as increasing the reliability of
the judicial process and decreasing the danger of deprivation of liberty.
However, the state could then permissibly shift the burden of persuasion
of a fact of the crime to the defendant on an arbitrary basis, the result
Mullaney sought to prevent.5"
C. Patterson v. New York
Two years later, almost to the date, the Supreme Court of the United
States was faced with its third major burden-shifting case, Patterson v. New
York." Marital difficulties had led Roberta Patterson to leave her husband
Gordon and seek a divorce from him, resuming a relationship with a former
53 Id. at 286-90. The rule was established in Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
54 Allen, supra note 52, at 290. Allen notes that the Mullaney statute should not have been
overruled on the basis of Winship because of "dramatic differences" between the interests
affected by the Winship statute and that of Mullaney. However, he does not state why the
Mullaney statutory scheme is different in its impact.
55 Merely minimizing the number of convictions based on factual error or maximizing
respect for the judicial process does not automatically render a law valid under Mullaney.
See Allen, supra note 52, at 285 n.44: "There may be constitutional interests other than those
articulated iin Winship that inhibit the power of the states to sanction the commission of
homicides as they please. This article maintains that other interests exist and that they hold
the key to Wilbur...."
In State v. Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Court stated:
[I]t is normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its
laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of
persuasion [and the Due Process Clause cannot be applied unless the state rule] offends
some principle of justice so deeply rooted in the traditions of conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.
Id. at 201-02.
56 432 U.S, 197 (1977),
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friend, John Northrup.57 At a later time, Gordon armed himself with a
rifle and went to the house of Roberta's father, where he saw his wife
semi-nude with her fiance and killed Northrup by firing two shots into his
head. Patterson later confessed to the killing and was charged with second
degree murder.5 At trial, Patterson claimed that he had acted under the
influence of extreme emotional distress and urged that he should be con-
victed, at most, only of first degree manslaughter. 9 Section 125.25(1)(a)
of the New York Penal Law provides that in a prosecution for intentional
murder, it is an affirmative defense that the accused:
acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of
which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the de-
fendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed
them to be."0
The jury was instructed that while the prosecution bore the burden of
proving the elements of the crime, intention to kill and causation of death,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant had the burden of proving the
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence." The jury found
appellant guilty of murder and judgment was entered on the verdict.
While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, the
Supreme Court decided Mullaney. Appellant Patterson urged in the court
of appeals that New York's murder statute was "functionally equivalent" to
the Maine statute struck down in Mullaney and that his conviction should
be reversed." The Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that, unlike
Mullaney, the fact bearing upon mitigation was not a fact essential to the
offense charged. The Court found that although the burden of persuasion
could not be placed upon the defendant to show sudden provocation in Maine,
the burden could be placed upon the defendant to show severe emotional
distress in New York because the affirmative defense had no direct relation-
ship to any element of murder. The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the Due Process Clause did not place New York in the position
of choosing between abandoning the affirmative defense altogether or disprov-
57 People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 347 N.E.2d 898, 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575
(1976).
58 Id. This confession was entered into evidence after a pretrial hearing at which voluntariness
was established.
59 Id. at 292, 347 N.E.2d at 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
60N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975).
61 432 U.S. at 200. The New York Penal Law places a different burden on "ordinary de-
fenses." The prosecution has the burden of disproving an ordinary defense beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence. N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 25(1) (McKinney 1975).
62 432 U.S. at 201.
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ing it beyond a reasonable doubt where it could constitutionally convict with-
out affording the defense in the first place and, of equal importance, that Mul-
laney could be distinguished because Patterson's defense did not negate any
element of the crime.6" Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall joined in
a fervent dissent that attacked the majority's opinion because "[t]his ex-
planation of the Mullaney holding bears little resemblance to the basic
rationale of that decision"6 and noted that "[riather, the defect in Maine
practice lay in its allocation of the burden of persuasion with respect to
the crucial factor distinguishing murder from manslaughter."6
The decision was a shock to the New York legal community. Several
commentators had predicted that New York's affirmative defense statute
would be held unconstitutional under Mullaney.66 Three lower court de-
cisions had held the law invalid.67 The similarities between the Maine
statute and the New York statute are many:
The sole factor that distinguishes murder from manslaughter in both states
is the existence of a negative-the absence of heat of passion in
Maine and the lack of extreme emotional disturbance in New York.
Neither mitigating factor rebuts any of the substantive facts the prose-
cution is required to prove. Rather, both are "collateral" to what the
state has defined as the principal facts in issue, and both are explanative
of the circumstances under which the defendant's intent was formed.
In both instances, the defendant is required to prove the existence of
this "collateral" mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.s
Of course, the critical question is whether the New York law offends the dual
interests critical to the Winship decision: the reduction of the threat of
erroneous convictions resulting from factual errors, and the fostering of
63 Id. at 209. The requirement that the state be constitutionally able to convict the defendant
on the "greater" offense is explicit:
But in each instance of a murder conviction under the present law, New York will
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally killed
another person, an act which it is not disputed the State may constitutionally criminalize
and punish. If the state nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the
degree of criminality or punishment, we think the state may assure itself that the
fact has been established with a reasonable certainty.
Id. at 210. The Court indicated for example, that proof of the identity of the accused could
not constitutionally create a presumption of all the facts essential to guilt.
64 Id. at 222-23.
65 Id. at 217.
66 See, e.g., Comment, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 493, 500-01 (1976); Note,
27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 459, 474 (1976).
67 People v. Davis, 49 A.D.2d 437, 376 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1975); People v. Woods, 84 Misc.
2d 301, 375 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1975); People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d
384 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
68 Comment, People v. Patterson: The Constitutionality of New York's Affirmative Defense
of Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 51 ST. JoHm's L. Rv. 158, 173 (1976).
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respect for the criminal justice system." But because of the similarities be-
tween the statutes, there is no reason to believe the mitigating factor in
Patterson made less difference to potential loss of liberty and reputation
than the defense of sudden provocation in Mullaney.
One rationale for the unexpected result is that the Court in Patterson
had recognized policy considerations rejected by the Mullaney Court. Justice
White, in his majority opinion, noted with respect to "severe emotional
distress":
The State was itself unwilling to undertake to establish the absence
of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps fearing that proof
would be too difficult and that too many persons deserving treatment
as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence need merely
raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's emotional state."'
Yet Mullaney had rejected the contention that the burden of proving
heat of passion should rest on the defendant because, like intent, the burden
required for its satisfaction the proof of facts peculiarly within the knowledge
of the defendant.' It recognized that the burden of proving the absence of
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt was also placed on the prosecution
in Maine even though the burden was "identical to the burden involved
in negating the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 7 2 Finally, the Mul-
laney Court admitted it could find no "unique hardship" that would justify
placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove a fact critical to
criminal culpability. 7 At least according to Mullaney, requiring the prosecu-
tion to bear the burden of showing the nonexistence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance did not constitute a unique hardship which would warrant shifting
the burden to the defendant. But the Mullaney decision, unlike that in
Patterson, did not examine the practical effect its determination might have
on state legislative bodies."'
69 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
70 432 U.S. at 207. In the lower court, Chief Judge Breitel apparently also feared that forcing
the prosecution to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue would encourage legislators
to repeal existing affirmative defenses rather than permit courts to strike them down and
convert them to ordinary defenses, which would result in the shift of the burden. See note 61
supra and accompanying text.
71 421 U.S. at 702-03.
72 Id.
73 Id. However, the Court did note that in some instances the prosecution was aided by a
presumption, citing Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (presumption of sanity)
or by a permissible inference, citing United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (infer-
ence of knowledge from presence at an illegal still).
74 The Patterson Court noted:
There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as construing the Due
Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact
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The greatest problem in Patterson is its interpretation of the Mullaney
decision. The Court in Patterson interpreted Mullaney not only as pro-
hibiting the placement of the burden on the defendant when proof of an
issue controverted a statutorily prescribed element of the crime, but also
as holding that the state bears the burden of proving an implied element of
the offense. The Patterson Court held that Mullaney required "[that] a State
must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that
ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense. '7 5 Thus, the
Patterson Court considered proof of heat of passion upon sudden provocation
as bearing upon a defined ingredient of the crime of murder rather than
upon the punishment for felonious homicide. This interpretation is further
supported by the Court: "Even so, a killing became murder in Maine when
it resulted from a deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against
another, 'suddenly, and without any, or without considerable provocation.' "76
From the language of the opinion, it is apparent that the Patterson
Court accepted the narrow reading of Mullaney, holding that the Mullaney
Court in fact applied its balancing approach to determine that proof upon
the mitigating factor of heat of passion was proof in contravention of an
element of murder. The Mullaney Court had rejected, however, the analysis
of the district court and the opinion of the First Circuit, construing the
statute in Maine as distinguishing murder from manslaughter because malice
aforethought was a fact essential to murder and was absent from man-
slaughter."' The only possible interpretation remaining is that the Mullaney
Court, irrespective of the statutory construction in the lower courts, judicially
implied the "element" of malice into the separate crime of murder."8 The
Patterson Court's interpretation of Mullaney would be consistent with the
opinion in that case.
Three factors indicate why the Patterson Court, in considering the New
York statute, did not concern itself with the balancing approach of Mullaney
in deciding whether the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion
with respect to severe emotional distress. Maine had at least included malice
affecting "the degree of criminal culpability." It is said that such a rule would deprive
legislatures of any discretion whatsover in allocating the burden of proof, the practical
effect of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our criminal justice system.
432 U.S. at 214 n.15. The text of the Mullaney opinion, however, gives no indication that
the Court intended Mullaney to have such a far-reaching effect.
75 432 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added).
7 6 d.
T7 421 U.S. at 691. See note 35 supra.
78 As noted previously, the use of the balancing approach to determine whether mitigating
factors are essential to disproving an "element" of the crime under the narrow interpretation
of Mullaney renders any statutory construction of the law meaningless. See note 47 supra.
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in the definition of the crime of felonious homicide in each of the separate
parts of the statute, the murder section and the manslaughter section. Before
guilt under the appropriate section could be determined, the presumption of
malice shifted the burden to the defendant to prove heat of passion. Thus,
Maine had hoped to shield itself from Winship by lumping both crimes
into the felonious homicide "heading" and arguing that murder and man-
slaughter were only classes of punishment."9 The New York statute allowed
conviction for murder without presuming any fact's existence for the prose-
cution of the defendant. All that need be proven was intent, an act, and
causation. No burden shifted to the defendant before he ;could be found
guilty under either section and the question of extreme emotional distress
would perhaps never be raised.8" The importance of the presumption in
Mullaney was sufficient to question whether it was an element, but the miti-
gating factor in Patterson was not.8
At least one reason the Court in Patterson did not consider whether ex-
treme emotional distress was an "element" of the offense might have been
the history of the defense. While Mullaney had indicated that a large factor
preventing the prosecution from shifting the burden of persuasion on the
issue of malice to the defendant was the historical trend requiring the prose-
cution to bear the burden on the issue,82 the Patterson Court noted with
respect to extreme emotional disturbance "that this defense is a considerably
expanded version of the common law defense of heat of passion on sudden
provocation and the burden of proving the latter, as well as other affirmative
defenses... rested on the defendant." '83 Thus, the defense did not have
the developed historical background characteristic of the heat of passion
defense. Justice Oakes, writing the concurring opinion in a Second Circuit
case, Farrell v. Czarnetzky,8" where the defendant had shouldered the burden
of proving by a preponderance that a firearm used in committing a robbery
was inoperable, indicated that the distinction may play a large role in re-
stricting the types of cases to which Mullaney can be applied.
79 421 U.S. 692-93.
80 432 U.S. at 209.
81 Clearly, however, it was not so much that malice had been presumed in Maine that
made it important but that it was a fact "the State deems so important that it must be
either proved or presumed ..." 432 U.S. at 215. In practical effect the New York statute
has the same result as a presumption, for if the mitigating factor is not proven, the defendant
is guilty of murder. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). Arguably the Mullaney
"substance" over "form" balancing approach should have applied in Patterson. Patterson
at least suggests that whether state legislation provides that a fact is presumed or that the
fact is an "affirmative defense" is an indicator of state interest under Mullaney's balancing
approach.
82 421 U.S. at 692-696.
83 432 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
84 566 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Finally, the oral arguments before the Court in Patterson85 indicated
that the Court could have found extreme emotional distress to negate the
element of intent if it had so chosen. The argument of Victor J. Rubino of
New York for the appellant, Patterson, was that defense of extreme emotional
distress was similar to provocation, and provocation rebutted the statutory
element of intent. He stated that:
We're dealing with burden of proof; malice is only relevant to the
proof by the state of intent, nothing else. Provocation is the other side
of malice. In New York, as in Maine, an intentional killing is murder
unless provocation is proved by the preponderance of the evidence
by the defendant. And it is this that goes to the due process violation."8
The Court apparently decided that the prosecution was correct in its view
that extreme emotional distress negated no element of the crime at all. Its
opinion was in agreement with John M. Finnerty, District attorney for
Steuben County, New York, who said: "The absence... isn't an element of
the crime; it merely changes the degree of the crime. Mitigation, counsel
maintained, is not constitutionally required. A defendant possesses unique
knowledge which the state allows him to use in mitigation.""7
The question of how far the Winship burden of proving "every fact"
rule should be extended is, as yet, unclear. The pure "elements" approach
has been rejected as being too restrictive in analysis and too tolerant of
legislative subterfuge. The Mullaney Court, it is submitted here, sought
to end the subterfuge through a balancing approach which would consider
the interests of the state and of the individual respectively. The Court in
Patterson, however, permitted legislative arbitrariness to continue as long as
a state defines a fact so that it merely "mitigates" the crime at hand, except
with the apparent limitations that the power to convict without the mitigating
factor must be constitutional and that, where a real balancing of state
and individual interests indicates the mitigating factor relates to an element
of the crime, the statute must bow to the Mullaney rationale.8 Patterson
thus represents a class of cases where the state's interest in placing the burden
of persuasion on the defendant is so great and the defendant's interest
85 20 CraM. L. REP. (BNA) 4199-4200 (March 23, 1977).
Id. at 4199.
87 id. at 4200.
88 The Patterson majority felt that there were constitutional limits beyond which the legis-
lature could not go, and apparently these are "only the most basic procedural safeguards..."
required by the Due Process Clause. 432 U.S. at 210. Justice Powell, author of the Mullaney
decision, wrote a dissenting opinion in Patterson which included speculation that a formal-
istically correct statute presuming guilt on the basis of a minor fact such as physical contact
and then permitting the defendant to go forward with an affirmative defense would with-
stand the principles of the majority opinion. 342 U.S. at 224-25 n.8.
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in being free of that burden is so small that there is nothing to balance
under Mullaney.
II. FACTORS TO BE WEIGHED IN THE BURDEN ALLOCATION DETERMINATION
To the extent that the Court in Mullaney weighed competing consider-
ations of state and individual interests to determine what facts should be
"elements" of the crime and on whom the burden should be placed, the
Court was only doing what the state legislators had been doing for years."'
Mullaney had merely affirmed the practice of weighing the interests and
analyzing the considerations in light of due process of law.90 The con-
siderations that legislatures and courts had used in the past to determine
on whom the burden should be placed, plus new interests deemed funda-
mental by the judiciary, could be used to satisfy the "balancing" test and,
therefore, it is important that an understanding of the interests affecting
the burden of persuasion in criminal cases be achieved.
During the nineteenth century, common law courts adopted the pattern
of uniformly imposing on the defendant in a criminal action the burden
of proving all matters which the common law lawyers referred to as "de-
fenses. '"91 The trend away from this pattern can be explained by the segre-
gation of concerns in the criminal courts from the concerns evolving in
private litigation. That is, the courts began to recognize that convicting a
criminal was different from settling a private dispute because in criminal
matters the state had to be more concerned with justly condemning a man
than with efficiently arriving at a fair settlement. The state had to justify
the use of its coercive powers.92 Accordingly, while courts in the United
States have expressed their willingness to adhere to the common law
crimes °" and common law principles for placing the burden of proving
89 The Mullaney Court, cannot, however, be accused of adopting a legislative function. By
using the phrase, "'every fact necessary to constitute the crime,' however, the Winship
Court indicated that the identity of those facts 'necessary to constitute the crime' presents
a federal question." Allen, supra note 52, at 270.
90 See, e.g., 421 U.S. at 700 n.27.
91 432 U.S. at 202; Fletcher, supra note 12, at 886.
92 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 888. Note, however, that Pennsylvania continues to place the
burden of proving all common law defenses on the defendant. Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414
Pa. 246, 199 A.2d 411 (1964) (self-defense); Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198
A.2d 534 (1964) (insanity); Commonwealth v. Burns, 367 Pa. 260, 80 A.2d 746 (1951)
(self-defense); Commonwealth v. lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935) (insanity).
93 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, § 9, at 60: "Thus, it was that most of the
states in the beginning had common law crimes. The states soon began to enact criminal
statutes; and in the nineteenth century a number of states attempted to enact comprehensive
statutory criminal codes .... "
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affirmative defenses,14 the more recent trend has not been towards the rule-
orientation approach of common law defenses, but towards a balancing
of respective interests of the state and the individual.
In Morrison v. California,95 under a state law prohibiting an alien
ineligible for citizenship to own or possess land, the Court held that it
violated the Due Process Clause for a state to place upon the defendant
the burden of proving citizenship as a defense." The Court noted that:
Other instances may have arisen or may develop in the future where
the balance of convenience can be redressed without oppression to
the defendant .... The decisive considerations are too variable, too
much distinctions of degree, too dependent in last analysis upon a
common sense estimate of fairness or facilities of proof, to be crowded
into a formula. One can do no more than adumbrate them; sharper
definition must await the specific case as it arises."
However, the trend comes about only in the face of a reluctance to sort
out the policy demands and to dispense with seemingly logical guidelines
for the allocation of burdens.9 s
94 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93 (9 Met. 1945). Many courts still do ad-
here to common law principles in placing the burden of proving affirmative defenses. See
Brown v. State, 48 Del. 427, 105 A.2d 646 (1954); State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St. 63, 95
N.E. 381 (1911). The York opinion is attributed with having heavily affected judicial thinking
of the time. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 903.
95291 U.S. 82 (1934).
96 Id. at 88. The state only had to show that defendant possessed the land and to allege
defendant's alienage.
S7Id. at 91.
98 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 894-95. The reluctance is illustrated by the Patterson Court's
interpretation of Mullaney as being yet another "elements" approach case rather than an
analysis of the impact of punishment on burden-shifting. See notes 42-44 supra and accom-
panying text.
It should be noted at this point that once the state makes a determination that policy
supports shifting the burden of persuasion to the accused, the particular defense involved
may be labelled differently. Although the distinction between a defense which relates to an
element of the crime and one which is used only in justification or as an excuse has often
been clouded by calling both sorts of defenses "affirmative defenses" (W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, supra note 9, at 46-47) the distinction is not without significance. It has been pointed
out that:
A true affirmative defense is a justification or excuse independent of the elements of the
offense. It is in the nature of a "confession and avoidance" type defense in that even if
the state proves all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant
may not be punished since commission of the offense was justified.
Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28 BAYLOR
L. REV. 120, 121 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Texas Penal Code Defenses]. The practice
of removing facts from the defense classification, on which the prosecution would bear the
burden of persuasion, and reclassifying them as "affirmative defenses" is, by all means, not
uncommon. See Agata, Survey of New York Law: Criminal Law, 27 SYRACUSE L. REv. 47, 56
n.49 (1976) (listing the affirmative defenses in New York).
Although the reclassification may not be binding for due process purposes, it may be
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A. Insanity
The courts have been most unwilling to depart from the common law
approach in placing the burden of persuasion with respect to the issue of
insanity on the defendant. The case of Leland v. Oregon99 involved a criminal
prosecution for murder in which the defendant had killed a fifteen year-old
girl by striking her over the head several times with a steel bar and stabbing
her twice with a hunting knife." While he confessed to the murder, he
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.' 0' The Supreme Court found that
the trial court could properly place the burden on the defendant to prove
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt since:
Today, Oregon is the only state that requires the accused, on a plea
of insanity, to establish that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Some
twenty states [require] ... preponderance of the evidence or some
measure of persuasion. While there is an evident distinction between
these two rules as to the quantum of proof required, we see no practical
difference of such magnitude as to be significant in determining the
constitutional question we face here.'
In light of the Mullaney dicta that the burden of persuasion cannot be shifted
to the defendant simply because the fact at issue is peculiarly within his
knowledge,"°3 Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
Leland rule was consistent with Mullaney because "the existence or non-
existence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or
nonexistence of the required mental elements of a crime."'0 4 Rehnquist's opin-
useful for orderly description and application, as well as to facilitate analysis of the problems
inherent in shifting the burden of persuasion. See Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong
Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 293, 308-12 (1975).
Apparently, based upon the Court's reasoning in State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103,
351 N.E.2d 88 (1965), the state of Ohio uses the term without reference to the distinction
above. Therefore, the term "affirmative defense" in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (A)
(Page 1975) can be used in referring both to defenses relating to elements of the crime
and to other defenses as well.
99 343 U.S. 790 (1952). While Leland represents the state rule on burden-shifting in insanity
cases, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) represents the federal rule, which pro-
hibits shifting the burden to the defendant to prove the defense of insanity by a preponderance.
100 343 U.S. at 792.
101Id. at 791. The Oregon statute read: "When the commission of the act charged as a
crime is proven, and the defense sought to be established is the insanity of the defendant,
the same must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt...." OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.390-.400
(repealed 1971).
102 d. at 798. At the present time, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia require
the defendant to rebut the presumption of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. See Note,
Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant,
56 B.U.L. REv. 499, 503 (1976). [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limitations].
'
0 3 See notes 70-74 and accompanying text rupra.
104 421 U.S. at 706.
Spring, 1978] COMMENT
21
Koenders: Shifting the Burden of Proving Self-Defense
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
AKRON LAW REVIEW
ion has been subject to heavy criticism by authors finding a strong relationship
to the element of intent.05
Since the decision in Mullaney, however, the Supreme Court has
failed to recognize Rehnquist's opinion as being in error. In Rivera v. Dela-
ware,'16 the Supreme Court of Delaware determined that a statute classifying
mental illness as a defense on which the defendant bore the burden of per-
suasion did not violate the Due Process Clause. The United States Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal of Rivera "for want of a substantial federal
question."' 7 Under the so-called "Hicks" rule, set forth in Hicks v. Miranda,'
such summary dismissal constitutes a decision on the merits. As Justice
White noted in Hicks: "We were not obligated to grant Miller v. California
plenary consideration, and we did not; but we were required to deal with
its merits. We did so by concluding that the appeal should be dismissed
because the constitutional challenge was not a substantial one." 9 Thus,
the Supreme Court has ruled upon the merits that a state's place-
ment of the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove insanity by a pre-
ponderance does not violate the Due Process Clause under Winship or
Mullaney.11
0
At least one pre-Mullaney case accepted the Rehnquist rationale that
"insanity" did not relate to an element of the crime,"' while another re-
jected sanity as being an element because it was interpreted as being a
condition precedent of all intelligent action."' Many state court decisions
continue to reject placing the burden of persuasion on the prosecution on
policy grounds. In State v. Murphey,"' the Missouri Supreme Court de-
clined to depart from the rule that the defendant should bear the burden of
proving insanity, affirming its earlier decision"' which had held that insanity
was too easily simulated to force the prosecution to bear the burden. Similar-
ly, a Nevada court held that in a case of criminal assault, freeing the de-
fendant of the burden of proving insanity defeated considerations of public
"-5 See Constitutional Limitations, supra note 102, at 510.
106 351 A.2d 561 (1976).
107 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
108 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
1o9 ld. at 344.
110 However, a problem with the Hicks rule is that the doctrine on which the Court is
ruling becomes obscured. For instance, it is difficult to determine whether the Court dis-
missed Rivera because shifting the burden to the defendant to prove insanity did not violate
Mullaney considerations or whether the Court determined that the interest was not sufficient
to invoke federal jurisdiction.
I11 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1962).
"12 State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 A. 905 (1904).
113 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W.2d 103 (1936).
"14 State v. Redemeier, 71 Mo. 173 (1879).
[V'ol. 11:4
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss4/7
Spring, 1978]
policy and injured the welfare of society."1 5 In a post-Mullaney case, State
v. Humphries,"' however, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the motion that
the defendant could be made to bear the weight of proving insanity by
preponderance. This decision was based purely on statutory construction.""
An obvious rationale for casting the burden on the defendant, how-
ever, is that regardless of whether a subjective test is applied, the defendant
possesses unique power over his mental facilities. For instance, the new
criminal code commentary in Arkansas justified placing the burden of per-
suasion with respect to insanity on the defendant because of "the unique
control the defendant has over inquiries into his mental state."' 8 While
experts in the field of criminal law recognize that the most common ex-
planation for casting the burden of persuasion on the defendant is that in-
sanity represents an affirmative defense of capacity rather than an element of
the crime, they affirm that "[a] supporting consideration is the fear that if
the rule were otherwise it would be too easy for a defendant who was sane
to create a reasonable doubt concerning his sanity."' " And the fact is that
although mental science has experienced great advances since the first shifts
of the burden of persuasion from the defendant began, the fields of psycho-
therapy and psychology are still inexact.'" The view expressed here is that
the more inexact that science is, the greater the likelihood that a sane in-
dividual will be able to raise a reasonable doubt as to his insanity. The in-
terests of society demand that he bear a greater burden than merely to
come forward with evidence on the issue.
B. Entrapment
According to Sorrells v. United States,12 1 one of the three leading cases
in the area, entrapment exists "when the criminal design originates with
115 State v. Nelson, 36 Nev. 403, 136 P. 377 (1913).
lie 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).
117 Id. The court found that insanity was an affirmative defense under Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.05(A) (Page 1975) and that State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88
(1976) had interpreted section 2901.05(A) as placing upon the defendant only the burden
of coming forward with evidence. The problem of including insanity in a general statutory
definition of "affirmative defense" is that even if the general rule is that the burden of per-
suasion may constitutionally be shifted to the defendant to show insanity, this possibility
would be negated by a ruling that shifting the burden of proving all affirmative defenses is
unconstitutional under that statute.
11s Osenbaugh, supra note 16, at 436-37. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-601 (Crim. Code
1976), Commentary.
119W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 40, at 313.
120 Diamond. The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 451
(1975); Ennis and Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693, 712 (1974).
121 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The other two cases are Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958), and a more recent pronouncement applying Mullaney to the entrapment defense,
State v. Matheson, 363 A.2d 716 (Me. 1976).
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the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its com-
mission in order that they may prosecute.' 1 2' The proper formulation of the
defense has generated conflicting views concerning many evidentiary and
constitutional considerations."' Yet the most important aspect about the
entrapment defense is not disputed: when the subjective view of entrapment
is adopted, the courts have read an implied exception into the particular
criminal statute involved.2 4
There are two theories of entrapment. The majority view was ex-
pounded in Sorrells, in which a government prohibition agent posing as an
Army soldier asked the defendant to sell him some whiskey. 2 The de-
fendant initially refused, but after several more offers he sold the agent
a half-gallon of whiskey and was charged with violating the National Pro-
hibition Act. The Sorrells Court, in finding that defendant had been unjustly
convicted, indicated that "the predisposition and criminal design of the
defendant are relevant"' to the issue of entrapment,2 8 and that the case
should be remanded for consideration of the defendant's predisposition. 27
In Sherman v. United States,"2 decided by the Supreme Court twenty-
six years later, the defendant was undergoing drug treatment along with a
police informer when the informer, claiming he was suffering from with-
drawal and needed drugs, asked the defendant to supply him."29 In finding
entrapment as a matter of law because of the extreme methods used to in-
duce the defendant to supply the drugs, the Court applied the subjective test
of entrapment. Justice Frankfurter, in a strong concurring opinion joined by
Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, espoused a different test, the ob-
jective test, of entrapment. He stated: "The courts refuse to convict an en-
trapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of
the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed
on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be coun-
tenanced."' 0
Therefore, the objective test focuses on the reasonableness of the
police activity leading to the ensuing arrest. Despite the merits of Frank-
122 287 U.S. at 442.
23 Id. at 441.
124 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 48, at 372.
125 287 U.S. at 439.
126 Id. at 451.
127 Id. at 452.
12" 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
129 Id. at 373.
130 Id. at 380.
[Vol. 11-.'4
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furter's rationale for the defense, the United States Supreme Court has re-
affirmed in two cases that the subjective test of entrapment is the better
view."' a
Each test has its own purpose. The theory is that while the objective
test provides guidance for law enforcement officials in regulating their
conduct, the subjective test only determines permissible police behavior on
the basis of the defendant's predisposition.' The focus of the objective
formulation is that overzealous law enforcement officers should be con-
trolled in their official conduct, thus leading to the conclusion that the de-
fendant should not be punished on policy grounds." The subjective approach
is based on the policy that conviction should be barred when government
agents have played a part in inducing the defendant unless he was predisposed
to commit the criminal act. Therefore, the theory rests upon an implied
exception to the definition of the crime, an exception going to the element
of intent."' Although the state legislature may have never intended to place
the exception in the statute, the courts may read it in."3 5 The entrapment
cases which allow the courts to read a defense into a statute that did not
contain the defense in the statutory definition exhibits even greater judicial
authority than the Mullaney decision which allows the courts to construe
a part of the definition of the crime as being an element.
It is also clear that when the subjective view is adopted, the rule of
Mullaney should apply. 3 In the recent case of State v. Matheson,' the
131 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973). Russell can also be attributed with holding that since the entrapment defense is not
of constitutional proportions, the entrapment test used by the Supreme Court is not binding
on state courts. Nonetheless, outrageous conduct of police officers may constitute a due
process violation and give rise to a valid constitutional claim. 411 U.S. at 433. The recent
case of State v. Matheson, 363 A.2d 716 (Me. 1976), indicates that the state courts may
follow the lead of the Supreme Court even though the defense is not of constitutional
proportions. See also infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
132 Comment, Constitutional and Legislative Issues Raised by the Entrapment Defense in
Maine, 29 MMNE L. REV. 170, 175 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Entrapment in Maine].
133 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, supra note 9, § 48, at 372; Entrapment in Maine, supra note
132, at 176. See also Fletcher, supra note 12, at 923, where he states: "If one excuses a
girl who succumbs to an offer of prostitution, one should also excuse officials who are
seduced by attractive bribes. Thus entrapment may not be an excuse at all; properly con-
strued it may be a device designed solely to discipline police behavior."
134 Entrapment in Maine, supra note 132, at 177.
135 See notes 35, 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
136 A number of state and federal courts prior to Mullaney had required the prosecution to
negate the defense of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Groessel, 440
F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Brown, 421 F.2d 1283, 1284 (9th Cir. 1970);
Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1967); Kadis v. United States, 373
F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967); State v. Murphey, 21 Ore. App. 630, 535 P.2d 779
(1975); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975); State v. Amundson, 69 Wis.2d
554, 564-65, 230 N.W.2d 775, 781 (1975). Contra, Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870, 871
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1973); State v. Taylor, 260 Iowa 634, 646, 144 N.W.2d 289, 296 (1966).
137363 A.2d 716 (Me. 1976).
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Maine Supreme Judicial Court applied the subjective test to the facts in-
volved. In Matheson, a police informer who had previously been a
friend of the defendant approached the defendant and asked him where
he could obtain drugs. Matheson led them to an individual who said they
could obtain "five hits of mescaline" for ten dollars. An undercover agent
who accompanied the informer then supplied money for purchase of the
drugs. Matheson was later charged with selling LSD-25 (D-lysergic acid
diethylamide) and moved for acquittal on the ground of entrapment.'
The Court held that the Mullaney rule applied to the subjective approach
of entrapment because predisposition was a fact critical to criminal culpa-
bility and predisposition was a fact to be considered by the jury in determining
Matheson's guilt or innocence." 9 Arguably, had the Maine Court instead rec-
ognized the objective approach to entrapment, which judges the activities of law
enforcement officers, the blameworthiness of the individual (found impor-
tant in Mullaney) would have been reduced to such a minimum factor under
the entrapment examination as to allow the state to constitutionally place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant."'
Adoption of the subjective test has, however, been criticized on policy
grounds. One author said:
The subjective test is distinctly ill-suited to [deter excessive police ac-
tivity] because acceptable levels of police conduct vary depending upon
the degree of the defendant's subjective predisposition. By requiring
the introduction of collateral issues necessary to prove predisposition,
the subjective test ignores the nature of the police conduct once pre-
disposition is established.1 '
The Model Penal Code states in support of the objective test that: "It is
the attempt to deter wrongful conduct on the part of the government that
provides the justification for the defense of entrapment, not the innocence
of the defendant.""' 2 Some courts, although not having found entrapment
under the majority view, have nevertheless found it on policy grounds using
their federal supervisory power, as where an informer hired on a contingent
fee basis was used to supply information concerning a particular person."
3
Nevertheless, the subjective approach to the entrapment defense continues
138 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2212-C (1964).
"39 363 A.2d at 722. See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 377.
140 See generally Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of
Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L. J. 871 (1976).
"'1 Entrapment in Maine, supra note 132, at 193.
142 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
"43Bullock v. United States, 383 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967); Williamson v. United States,
311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962). These cases, however, did not reject the majority approach. See
W. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr, supra note 9, § 48, at 373 n.24.
[Vol. 11:4
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to be the majority position and the courts seem willing to continue implying
the defense of entrapment into the criminal statutes that come before them.
C. Self-Defense
The excuse of self-defense exists because of an assumption that it is
only just for a person who has no opportunity to resort to the law for his
defense to be able to take reasonable steps to defend himself from unlawful
physical harm.'" However, for the defendant to claim self-defense as an
excuse for assault, he must actually believe there is a necessity for force
and that the unlawful violence is imminent or immediate. " ' The conflict
involves the determination of who has the burden of persuading the fact-
finder that the defendant acted in self-defense. A number of interests are
involved.
The majority view is that the prosecution bears the burden of proving
the defendant did not act in self-defense, and that the state may place only
the burden of going forward with evidence on the defendant.1" Only a
small minority of courts have placed the burden of proving self-defense
by a preponderance on the defendant. " " One explanation for placing the
burden on the defendant is that by asserting the defense, the defendant is ad-
mitting facts which absent excuse or justification would constitute unlawful
homicide.' 8 This view has been rejected by some authorities because it
attempts to carry over the "confession and avoidance" rationale of civil
cases into the criminal law field. 49 Another explanation is that the state
courts are intent on adhering to the traditional common law model where
144 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 9 § 53, at 391. Self-defense is used in the strict sense
here to exclude analysis of policies involving defenses of other persons or the defense of
habitation. For burden of proof in self-defense claims generally, see 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homi-
cide § 248 (1968).
"45See Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466 (1896); Beard v. United States, 158 U.S.
550, 560 (1895).
L46 DeGroot v. United States, 78 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1935); Frank v. United States, 42 F.2d
623 (9th Cir. 1930); State v. Millet, 273 A.2d 504, 507 (Me. 1971).
47 Long v. State, 3 Md. App. 638, 240 A.2d 620 (1968); Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36,
117 N.E. 12 (1917); Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970);
State v. Ballou, 20 R.I. 607, 40 A. 861 (1898); State v. Dillard, 59 W. Va. 197, 53 S.E.
117 (1906); State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 S.E. 613 (1900).
148 Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. at 85, 265 A.2d at 114.
149See Pounders v. State, 282 Ala. 551, 552, 213 So.2d 394, 395 (1968), in which the Court
stated: "A plea of self-defense in a criminal trial is not an affirmative plea of confession and
avoidance on which defendant has the burden of proof as he does on such a plea in a civil
case." See also Fletcher, supra note 12, at 910, where he explains the historical background
of the confusion:
Before the turn of the 20th century, jurists in both common law and Continental juris-
dictions approached decisions on the burden of persuasion in criminal cases as they
did in private disputes, and in doing so they devised rules of criminal liability that had
the form of the rules used in settling private disputes.
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the burden of persuasion was placed on the defendant. 5 ' Finally, at least
one court has expressed the view that because self-defense is similar to
excuse by necessity, defendant should bear the burden of persuasion by the
greater weight of the evidence. 5'
The majority view is also supported by a number of interests. The most
frequent explanation for imposing the burden on the state to prove that the
defendant did not act in self-defense is that it will reduce jury confusion."'
If the burden of persuasion is on the defendant, then the court must instruct
the jury that the defendant bears the burden of proving by some standard
that he acted in self-defense while the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the defendant is guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
State v. Malone,5 ' the Missouri Supreme Court found that self-defense went
to the element of malice which the state was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that a jury instruction which placed the burden of
proving self-defense on the defendant could not be cured by a concluding
statement in the instruction that placed the burden of proving guilt on the
prosecution. The court stated:
A lawyer might work out a construction to reconcile and harmonize
that positive direction with the concluding sentence and the presump-
tion of innocence to which the defendant is entitled, but it is not
likely a jury of laymen could do so. To say the best of it, the instruc-
tion was likely to be misunderstood by, and to mislead the jury.'
The confusion which can be generated by placing the burden of proving self-
defense by a preponderance on the defendant is not, however, a peculiarity of
those cases where self-defense relates to an element of the crime.
155
Another argument supporting the majority view is that self-defense may
negate an element of the offense such as malice or may "refute the unlaw-
fulness of the killing itself," and thus set a foundation for application of
15OQuillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 110 A.2d 445 (1955) (in which the Court noted its
homicide law was based in general on the common law of England as it existed in 1776,
and that the burden under the common law was placed on the defendant); Commonwealth
v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970).
151 State v. Osborne, 202 S.C. 473, 25 S.E.2d 561, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 763 (1943).
152 State v. Millet, 273 A.2d 504, 507 (Me. 1971).
153 327 Mo. 1217, 39 S.W.2d 786 (1931).
154 Id. at 1228, 39 S.W.2d at 790; see Leonard v. People, 149 Colo. 360, 369 P.2d 54 (1962)
(where the Court determined that the effect of forcing the defendant to rebut the inference
of malice was to create a jury instruction placing the burden upon him to prove no crime
was committed).
'55See Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, 179 A.2d 880 (1962) (where the court was held to
have instructed the jury, in effect, that the trier of fact could weigh the evidence of self-
defense alone to reach a determination of guilt).
[Vol. 11:4
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Mullaney.5 ' Some courts have construed the defense similarly to the denial
of alibi,1" saying that the defense goes to the crime itself, and that the
state should bear the burden of persuasion because "[it is upon the State
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was feloniously and
criminal and was not therefore done in self-defense."' 8 This argument is
apparently based on the rationale that in order for a state to use its coercive
powers against a person, that person must be "morally blameworthy."' 9
This rationale has been viewed as the foundation for the Winship decision
and is recognized as being the predominant modem concern in applying
punishment. 10
More important, it has been suggested that if self-defense significantly
reduces or eliminates punishment to be imposed for an offense, Mullaney
should apply to self-defense regardless of whether self-defense relates to an
element or to the felonious nature of the crime as a whole. 6' The United
States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. The only self-defense
case involving Mullaney questions which has come before the United States
Supreme Court is State v. Hankerson."' in which the North Carolina Supreme
Court, while refusing to apply Mullaney retroactively, determined in ac-
cordance with the Mullaney Court, that mandatory presumptions which
place the burden of persuasion on the defendant to show the absence of
malice or unlawfulness in homicide cases are improper when the issue of
their existence is raised by the evidence. The North Carolina Supreme Court
stated, "the State must bear the burden throughout the trial of proving
each element of the crime charged including, where applicable, malice and
156 See Unburdening the Criminal Defendant, supra note 22, at 406. The Mullaney Court
expressly stated that placing the burden of proving a negative on the prosecution with respect
to self-defense did not put too onerous a burden on the prosecution. 421 U.S. at 703 n.31.
167 See notes 167-171 and accompanying text infra.
158 State v. Carter, 227 La. 820, 827, 80 So. 2d 420, 423 (1955). See State v. Conda, 156
La. 679, 680, 101 So. 19, 20 (1924). Note the definition of "felonious" in Black's Law Dic-
tionary 743-44 (rev. 4th ed. 1968):
A technical word of law which means done with intent to commit crime; of the grade
or quality of a felony; such an assault on the person as, if consummated, would subject
party making it, on conviction, to punishment of a felony. . . . Malicious, villainous;
traitorous. . . . Malignant. . . .Wrongful. . . . Proceeding from an evil heart or pur-
posely. Wickedly and against the admonition of the law; unlawfully.
159 See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 890:
To treat two men alike, one who has caused harm culpably and the other who has done
so without culpability, is to ignore a morally significant distinction between them ...
The postulate that only the blameworthy should suffer under the criminal law becomes
a standard for fairly and equally distributing the burdens of criminal sanctions.
160 Comment, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emo-
tional Disturbance, 43 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 171, 190 (1976).
161 See Unburdening the Criminal Defendant, supra note 22, at 407.
162 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975).
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unlawfulness beyond a reasonable doubt,"' 3 indicating that the Court had
held the presumptions to be elements of the crime of murder in the same
way the Mullaney Court had found malice to be an element of murder.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court found no reversible error in
the decision of the lower court. The case was subsequently reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that Mullaney was to be ap-
plied retroactively and that the trial court proceedings threatened "substantial
impairment" of the truth-determining process and inaccuracy in the guilty
verdict because the defendant had been forced to bear the burden of proving
self-defense without considering whether this practice was permissible under
Mullaney.'8 " However, the United States Supreme Court did not determine
whether proof of self-defense went to an "element" of the crime."' 5
D. Alibi
Although alibi has often been characterized as an affirmative defense,
it is not really a defense to the crime but a denial that one participated in
the crime at all.1"' Nevertheless, alibi is treated similarly to other defenses
when the state is engaged in determining on whom the burden of persuasion
will be placed. Because its treatment is indicative of the balancing of in-
terests approach analyzed here, a discussion of alibi is essential.
The leading case in the area is Stump v. Bennett,",a habeas corpus
proceeding involving the question of whether a state trial court could properly
place upon the defendant the burden of proving his sole defense of alibi
by a preponderance. 6 The Court reasoned that alibi relates to the presence
of the defendant at the scene of the crime and that, therefore, "[p]roof of
the defendant's presence and participation is a wholly indispensable factor
to the government's case; it is a sine qua non to sustain a verdict of guilty."'89
163 288 N.C. at 651, 220 S.E.2d at 589.
164 North Carolina v. Hankerson, 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
185See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court noted that the State
did not argue that "despite Mullaney v. Wilbur it is constitutionally permissible for a State
to treat self-defense as an affirmative defense that the prosecution need not negative by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we do not address that issue in this case." 97 S.Ct.
at 2344 n.6. This indicates that the Supreme Court may have been concerned only with a
narrower "elements" approach examination in the Hankerson case, although that concern
did not play a part in the final decision of the case.
16 MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 341 at 801; W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, § 47, at
359 n.19. But see People v. Silvia, 389 Ill. 346, 59 N.E.2d 821 (1945). Generally, affirma-
tive defenses do not relate to the substance of the crime, but to its inculpating character.
187398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968). That same year the
United States Supreme Court remanded Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253 (1968), an alibi
case, to the Eighth Circuit for reconsideration under Stump.
168 398 F.2d at 113. In 1968, two states, Iowa and Georgia, still placed the burden of persua-
sion on the defendant to prove his alibi defense by a preponderance. Id, at 114.
169 1d, at 119-20,
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The Court considered it a violation of due process under the fourteenth
amendment to shift to the defendant the burden of disproving "essential ele-
ments of a crime."170 This view indicates that an element could be as broad
as the crime itself, a concept apparently envisioned by the majority decision
in the Winship opinion. However, it also supports the broad interpretation
of Mullaney that any matter affecting guilt under the statutory crime relates
to an "element" of the crime.'
One argument for placing the burden of persuasion on the state is
an argument that has been used to justify placing the burden of negating
self-defense on the state. That is, placing the burden on the defendant leads to
jury confusion because of the problem of instructing the jury that even
though the defendant bears the burden of proving he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed, the prosecution bore the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime."7 2
This argument was raised in Smith v. Smith, 7 ' a Fifth Circuit case
finally resolving the alibi issue in the state of Georgia, which was the last
state to retain the rule that the defendant should prove alibi by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The Court repeated the rationale of Stump, saying
that to require the defendant to prove alibi will result in a shift of the burden
of proof as to essential elements of the crime and will render the trial funda-
mentally unfair. The court also commented on the confusing jury instruc-
tion that the jury be "reasonably satisfied" with the alibi evidence presented
by the defendant and stated:
Although it is possible that the Georgia charge does not require a
preponderance of the evidence, the fact of which even Georgia courts
are not convinced, we find the actual standard utilized to be immaterial.
It is enough to say that it is clear that Georgia defendants have some
burden on their alibi defense.'
Smith overruled Thornton v. State'" and the line of cases in Georgia which
had held alibi to be an affirmative defense, and thereby had required the
defendant to prove alibi by a preponderance.
170 Id at 118.
17' See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra. Patterson remains intact under this view
because the question of guilt is settled prior to submitting evidence in mitigation of the
crime. The question of mitigation is not an indispensable factor in the government's case.
172 See Texas Penal Code Defenses, supra note 98, at 125.
'75 454 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 885 (1972).
174 Id. at 577-78. The Court added: 'The quantum of proof required of the defendant is
not clear. The defendant clearly is not required to prove his alibi beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . There has, however, been some question in the past as to whether defendant must
prove his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 578 n.2.
175 226 Ga. 837, 178 S.E.2d 193 (1970).
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There is one inconsistency in the reasoning that presence at the scene
of the crime is a sine qua non of conviction. Courts considering the issue
of alibi have traditionally refused to instruct the jury that the defendant
could be found innocent if he generated a reasonable doubt in their minds
as to his presence at the crime itself.'76 The courts so holding have generally
based their decisions on the rationale that the jury must consider the totality
of the evidence in determining whether they have a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt. If alibi were a sine qua non of conviction, then it
seems that a jury verdict in favor of the defendant on that issue alone
would be permissible. It is crucial to recognize that if a state considers pres-
ence as being one of the facts necessary for conviction, whether expressed
or implied in the particular statute involved, then Winship requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of the separate fact of presence in order to
convict. 77 Therefore, at least under Winship, presence can be recognized as a
sine qua non of conviction. However, the line of cases restricting the jury
to a consideration of the totality of the evidence has not been overruled." '
E. Accident
In alleging that a crime occurred accidentally, the defendant can raise
either the defense that the crime occurred without the necessary mental
element, or the affirmative defense that the factual aspects of the crime
charged against him did occur but that no criminal liability should
attach because he was engaged in a lawful activity and was guilty
of no culpable conduct. In those states with statutes which place
the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove affirmative defenses if
he chooses to alleviate or mitigate the crime of homicide, the courts have
split on whether such statutes are applicable to the defense of accident.
Courts which have placed the burden upon the defendant to prove accident
have done so on the basis of a rationale similar to that used in placing the
burden on the defendant in self-defense cases. That is, some courts have
recognized that the defendant is admitting the facts of the crime and, there-
fore, he should bear the burden of proving any excuse or mitigation of the
act."' Some have placed the burden on the defendant because in the case
176 Johnson v. State, 223 Ala. 332, 135 So. 592 (1931); Nichols v. State, 27 Ala. 435, 173
So. 652 (1937); Solomon v. State, 44 Ga. App. 755, 162 S.E. 863 (1932); People v. Lacey,
339 Ill. 480, 171 N.E. 544 (1930); Flanagan v. People, 214 Ill. 170, 73 N.E. 347 (1905);
Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 134 P. 260 (1913).
177 Winship required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "every fact" necessary to constitute
the crime. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
178 See Annot., 124 A.L.R. 471, 475 (1940).
179 Jimmerson v. State, 169 Ark. 353, 275 S.W. 662 (1925); Chandle v. State, 230 Ga. 574,
198 S.E.2d 289 (1973); People v. Slaughter, 29 Ill. 2d 384, 194 N.E.2d 193 (1963), rev'd
on other grounds, 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968); People v. Franklin, 390 M. 108,
60 N.E.2d 870 (1945); People v. Morrison, 52 Ill. App. 2d 9, 201 N.E.2d 639 (1964).
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of homicide, death by means of a deadly weapon does not normally occur
by accident. 8 ' It is also common for state courts to place the burden on
the prosecution because, irrespective of the statute involved, it is incumbent
on the prosecution to show that killing was done intentionally.' Irres-
pective of a state statute imposing the burden of establishing the facts of
an excuse or justification on the defendant, the prosecution has been re-
quired to take the burden of proving a non-accidental situation where the
defendant, in pleading not guilty to the offense, relied upon no facts separate
from those of the offense itself.'82
It is to be noted that the same problems with respect to jury con-
fusion exist in the case of accident as in other defenses where the courts have
determined that the defendant bears the burden of proving his defense by
a preponderance. A double problem exists when accident and self-defense
are pled as defenses in the same case. If the prosecution bears the burden
of proving the negative on both issues, no problem is apparent. However,
where the defendant bears the burden on both issues, he is in the unenviable
position of being forced to prove, in the case of self-defense, that the act
was intentional and justified and, in the case of accident, that the act was
unintentional. A jury instruction has been considered grounds for reversal
where the concepts are intermingled, 83 yet the danger of confusion pre-
1BoSee Partin v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1969), in which the court also stated
that even if accident should be shown, a killing would not normally occur except in the case
of the highest degree of negligence. Id. at 436.
181 State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So. 2d 249 (1943); State v. Phillips 264 N.C. 508,
142 S.E.2d 337 (1965) (stating that while accident is a denial of the crime, it could be
refuted by the prosecution's proof of intention); State v. Oakes, 129 Vt. 241, 276 A.2d 18,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1971). See also Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N.E. 79(1894), in which the Court stated:
This language [of the statute], while it supports the proposition that one shall be held
to intend to do that which his deliberate acts necessarily or naturally tend to produce,
it affords no support for the contention that he shall be held to intend the consequences
of all of his acts, irrespective of whether those acts were voluntary or involuntary, and
that the burden is on him to show that he did not.
Id. at 344, 38 N.E. at 83.
Note that OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (A) (1) (Page 1975) requires that the
defendant's criminal "liability is based on conduct which includes either a voluntary act, or
an omission to perform an act or duty which he is capable of performing." If the defendant
can successfully contend that the facts on which he relies for his defense of accident also
show that the allegedly "criminal" act was not done voluntarily, he has one more argument
for placing the burden on the prosecution to show non-accident. It is absurd to suppose
that the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements of the crime but not criminal
liability itself. A similar argument would arise if the defendant could successfully contend
that the facts on which he relies for his defense of self-defense indicate that the allegedly
"criminal" act was done involuntarily. See notes 241-246 and accompanying text infra.
182 Richardson v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 524, 24 S.W. 894 (1894). Contra, Bussey v. State, 147
Tex. Crim. 447, 181 S.W.2d 94 (1944).
183 State v. Ferguson, 91 S.C. 235, 74 S.E. 502 (1912). The latter problem may not exist
in Ohio, since a recent Ohio case considers accident to be a defense which relates to the
element of intention, to be proved by the prosecution. State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St. 2d 18,
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sented in this circumstance has never been successfully used as a rationale
to shift the burden of persuasion to the prosecution on both issues where
both defenses are considered affirmative defenses.
F. Other Interests
One of the largest conflicts between Mullaney and Patterson stems
from each opinion's consideration of the burden placed on the state, not
in the theoretical sense of whether the burden of going forward or the
burden of persuasion is required, but in the practical sense of the difficulty
in gathering and presenting evidence to prove a fact of the crime." ' The
rule favored in Patterson is "[a] doctrine often repeated by the courts
[that] where the facts with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge
of a party, that party has the burden of proving the issue." '
The claim that the defendant's superior access to evidence justifies shift-
ing the burden to him to prove the fact in mitigation, justification or excuse
of the crime plays an important role in defenses other than those of insanity
or mental distress.' For instance, in the case of State v. Rowe,8 7 the de-
fendant pled that he could not be guilty of embezzlement because he was
under the age required to sustain a conviction pursuant to the state statute
creating the general offense of embezzlement. The Maine Supreme Court
said:
Therefore, in a situation where the facts relating to the exception are
difficult for the state to obtain and are at the same time peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendants, the exception is usually con-
sidered as a defense or jusification and not as a part of the description
of the offense itself.'
This resulted in placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove
294 N.E.2d 888 (1973). However, if self-defense were considered an affirmative defense on
which the defendant bore the burden of persuasion, the problem of jury confusion discussed
earlier would still exist. See notes 152-55 and accompanying text supra.
'
8 4 See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra.
18AMcCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 337, at 787. Professor McCormick views the rationale as
being of decreasing importance:
Expanded pretrial discovery would seem to have diminished greatly whatever importance
this factor had in allocating the burdens. However, there has been no rush by the
courts to reassess allocations between the parties in light of expanded discovery, per-
haps attesting to the fact that exclusive knowledge in one party has seldom been the
controlling reason for assigning the burdens of proof.
Id. at 787 n.19. There may, however, be peculiar problems involved in the defenses of insanity
and mental distress that cannot be sufficiently alleviated by pretrial discovery. See notes
118-20 and accompanying text supra.
'
8 See notes 118-20 and accompanying text supra.
1ST 238 A.2d 217 (Me. 1968).
188 Id. at 222, quoting Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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his true age. The argument that defendant's superior knowledge of a fact
justifies placing the burden of persuasion on him has the advantage of
eliciting relevant evidence that the state would otherwise be unable to
acquire.189 Therefore, shifting the burden in such cases mitigates the pro-
bability of erroneous convictions based upon factual errors. Unfortunately,
however, the argument has been used to shift the burden as to facts which
are rightfully within the knowledge of the defendant even though the state
has not claimed inaccessability to the same knowledge.'9°
A closely related justification for shifting the burden is not that the facts
are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, but that probabilities are
great that the defense would never exist. Professor Cleary has noted that in de-
termining this issue, the courts will either consider the probabilities generally,
or will consider the probabilities in prior litigated cases specifically, that the
event from which the defense arises is an unusual one. He has indicated
that the courts are on much safer ground when using litigated cases as the
basis for estimating the probabilities.' However, even if the more reliable
universe of litigated cases is adopted, it is difficult to see how the statistical
analysis approach helps to solve either aim of Mullaney, to help reduce the
number of convictions based upon factual errors or to increase the integrity
of and respect for the judicial process. But if a statistical analysis is not
used, the measure of an "unusual" defense is unclear. A second problem is
that the logical result of this analysis is to place a doubly heavy burden on
the defendant, since in addition to bearing the burden of proof on the issue,
the fact finder will be justifiably skeptical that the event in question ever
occurred. 9 2
Apart from these formulations, courts have based their rules for either
shifting the burden to the defendant or leaving that burden on the prosecution
upon the nature of the specific defense alleged. For instance, because an in-
toxicated person may have been in such a condition that he arguably could
not have formed the requisite criminal intent to be criminally responsible for
his acts, the prosecution has often borne the burden of showing he is morally
1 S9 For other defenses in which the defendant has superior knowledge, see generally Under-
wood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86
YALE L. J. 1299, 1333-36 (1977).
100 People v. Dean, 131 Cal. App. 228, 234, 21 P.2d 126, 128 (1933). Fletcher, supra note
12, at 909, indicates that the argument is based primarily on the common law practice of
interweaving pleading rules with burden concepts, often resulting in injustice to a particular
defendant. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 337, at 785-86.
191 Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5,
12-14 (1959). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 337, at 787.
192 Underwood, supra note 189, at 1337-38.
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blameworthy."' The Model Penal Code has, at times, placed the burden
of persuasion on the defendant merely out of compromise, as in the case
of corporate exculpation from products liability.9 It has been noted that
such a rule is desirable because corporations should not be held liable where
they have exercised due diligence and the courts should not have to prove
lack of due diligence in every case before them. The rule reduces the
possibility of factual error and increases judicial efficiency.'95 The courts
have, however, required the defendant to bear the burden of persuasion
when he challenges the unconstitutionality of a statute under which he has
been charged for the twofold reason that statutes promulgated by the state
are presumed to be valid and that the courts are generally reluctant to
declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional." 6
III. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROVING SELF-DEFENSE IN OHIO
The general considerations affecting burden. allocation that should
be included in the balancing type of process favored by the Supreme Court
in Mullaney and Patterson have already been discussed."' However, there
are a number of considerations peculiar to Ohio law that must be weighed
by the courts and the legislature in determining whether it is constitutional
to shift the burden of proof of self-defense by any standard of proof to the
defendant.
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that self-defense is not merely
an excuse to unlawful homicide, but a justification for the homicide barring
application of criminal sanctions. " ' That this rule has a constitutional foun-
dation was pointed out in Erwin v. State,9 ' a case in which the victim's
death was caused by a shot from a pistol and the testimony indicated the
homicide resulted from a sudden quarrel and was done in defense of the
defendant's person and property."' While the court noted that the common
law had separated "homicide from necessity" into two categories, homicide
which was justifiable and homicide which was excusable, it said that the
distinction was not important in Ohio since "[i]t is true, under our con-
'93 People v. Evrard, 55 I11. App. 2d 270, 204 N.E.2d 777 (1965). Contra, State v. Hill,
46 La. Ann. 27, 14 So. 294 (1894). A defendant is guilty if he is found criminally liable,
but he is blameworthy if he morally deserves punishment. In the case of strict liability, a
defendant may be found criminally liable for committing the crime though not morally
blameworthy.
194 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (5) (1962).
1"5 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 9, § 8, at 49.
196 See Thiele v. City & County of Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 312 P.2d 786 (1957).
'l See notes 144-65 and accompanying text supra.
'98 Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875).
199 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).
2
*0 Id. at 190.
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stitution, whether the killing in self-defense be justifiable or excusable, there
must be an entire acquittal, for the reason that there is no forfeiture of
goods in cases of excusable homicide."2"1 The failure to give weight to the
distinction is consistent with the king's treatment of excusable homicide under
the common law. As one author notes, pardons for excusable homicide
were eventually offered as a matter of course and the practice of confiscating
goods and chattels of one found guilty of excusable homicide fell into
disuse. 2
The rule established by Erwin in 1876 has been left unchanged by
present judicial decisions, indicating that the justification of self-defense in
Ohio is not a recent invention of the legislature as was the mitigating factor
in Patterson, but a historical defense similar to heat of passion in Mullaney.
A second consideration supported by these cases is the widely divergent
consequences to the defendant if the burden of proving self-defense is shifted
to him. If he fails in proving self-defense, the maximum penalty is death,
but if he succeeds he will be acquitted.0 ' These consequences are more
divergent than those to be suffered by the defendant in Mullaney and far
more divergent than the consequences to the defendant in Patterson."'
An historical review of the Ohio statutes proscribing murder indicates
that from the earliest Ohio legislation, self-defense related to an element
of the crime. The murder statute enacted by the First Session, Third Assem-
bly of the Ohio legislature in 1804 stated that no person "of sound memory
and discretion, shall unlawfully kill any human being ... with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied." ' 5 The word "unlawful" remained in
the Ohio murder statute until 1814, when the statute required that no person
"shall purposely, of deliberate and premeditated malice, or in the perpetra-
tion or attempt to perpetrate any rape, arson, robbery or burglary, kill
another . ..,,'
The Ohio cases construing the "malice" wording in Ohio statutes sub-
sequent to that time have, however, noted that this wording still means the
2011d. at 199. Under English law, one found guilty of excusable homicide forfeited his goods
and his chattels. R. PERmINS, CRIMINAL LAW 1001 (2d ed. 1969).
202 R. PERKNs, supra note 201, at 1001.
203 See Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Page 1975), allowing the death penalty to be
imposed for aggravated murder, and § 2929.03(A) (Page 1975), allowing imposition of life
imprisonment when murder is committed.
204 See note 38 supra. In Patterson, the maximum penalty ranged between 25 years imprison-
ment and life imprisonment, depending on whether the mitigating factor was proven. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1975).
205 3 LAWS OF Omo 2 (emphasis added).
206 13 LAWS OF Omo 86. (emphasis added).
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killing must be an "unlawful" one.2"' The significance of this fact is that
for well over a century and a half, both the Ohio legislature and the Ohio
courts recognized that the crime of murder should contain an element
negating the defense of self-defense. An application of Mullaney to the Ohio
statutes existing until 1974 would have led to the conclusion that because
"unlawfulness" was an element of the crime of murder, whether expressly
or by implication, the prosecution should therefore bear the burden of
establishing that the defendant was not entitled to acquittal on the basis
of self-defense.
The requirement of "malice" remained in the Ohio murder statute
until 1974, when the murder statute in Ohio was changed to read, "No
person shall purposely cause the death of another."2 °8 Yet, the serious
question arises of whether the "unlawfulness" element should still be read into
the murder statute under a theory similar to that used in the case of the
"implied exception" for entrapment or that used in finding that alibi negates
an "element" of the crime.00 One such theory was raised by Justice White-
side in his concurring opinion in State v. Robinson,1' in which he stated:
With respect to self-defense, unlike insanity, the defense is not con-
sidered by the jury only after it has found that all elements of the
offense, including mens rea, if required, have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Rather, the existence or nonexistence of self-defense
bears a direct relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the re-
quired mental elements of the crime. Although Mullaney is factually
distinguishable, I can find no logical justification for placing the burden
of proving self-defense upon the defendant, if placing the burden of
207 State v. Childers, 133 Ohio St. 508, 14 N.E.2d 767 (1938) (indictment charging "unlaw-
ful" homicide need not state it was done "maliciously"); State v. Esherick, 19 Ohio App.
2d 40, 45, 249 N.E.2d 78, 82 (1969) ("[murder] in the second degree is the unlawful, ma-
licious and intentional killing of a human being"); Zeltner v. State, 13 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 417,
426-27 (Wood County 1899), aff'd, 62 Ohio St. 655, 58 N.E. 1103 (1900) (proper charge
to jury contained the word "unlawful"); State v. Miller, 7 Ohio N.P. 458 (Seneca County
1895) (proper charge to jury contained the word "unlawful"). See also R. PERKINs, supra
note 201, at 334, where he explains 'that 'malice', as it is generally used in the law, means
intentional harm caused without lawful justification or excuse," indicating that self-defense
can be considered a defense to malice just as it can be to unlawfulness.
208 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02(A) (Page 1975). "Aggravated murder" was defined to
require that a person had "purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause[d] the
death of another." Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (A) (Page 1975). The wording "with
prior calculation and design" was not a substitute for the word "malice" but an explanation
of the premeditation and deliberation required for the crime. The Ohio Supreme Court noted
in State v. Toth, 52 Ohio St. 2d 206, 217, 371 N.E.2d 831, 837-38 (1977): "In Patterson
v. New York... the Supreme Court of the United States expressly upheld the right of the
state of New York to exclude malice aforethought as one of the elements of the crime of
second degree murder."
209 See notes 134, 171 and accompanying text Fupra.
21048 Ohio App. 2d 197, 206, 356 N.E.2d 725, 731 (1975).
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proving that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation
is unconstitutional. 1
Although it is suggested that self-defense bears upon the required mental
elements of the crime, there is no basis in Ohio's statutory definition of
"purposely" for concluding that "purpose" can be found only by negating
the facts constituting self-defense. The statute defining "culpable mental
states" provides that "[a] person acts purposely when it is his specific in-
tention to cause a certain result .. ,,.1 This approach to culpability seems
to be result-oriented and motive becomes irrelevant to guilt. That the legis-
lature nevertheless felt that self-defense should have some bearing upon
the mental aspect of murder is indicated by its Committee Comment to
Ohio Revised Code section 2901.21, in which it stated that an essential
part of any crime must be "a certain guilty state of mind at the time of
his act or failure." 1 ' Because self-defense is a justification evidencing a
non-culpable state of mind, an element of "unlawfulness" must be read into
the statute to reflect legislative intent. This being so, the burden of persuasion
must then shift to the prosecution to prove the lack of self-defense.
A second theory for reading "unlawfulness" into the Ohio murder
statute is that the English common law required murder to be an unlawful
211 Id. at 209, 356 N.E.2d at 732.
-. 2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (A) (Page 1975). Lord Justice Asquith noted in
Cunliffe v. Goodman, 1 All E.R. 720, 724, 2 K.B. 237, 253 (1950):
An intention to my mind, connotes a state of affairs which the party "intending"-I
will call him X--does more than merely contemplate. It connotes a state of affairs
which, on the contrary, he decides, so far as in him lies, to bring about, and which,
in point of possibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about by
his own act of volition.
It would be difficult to argue that a person acting in self-defense does not have an "intention"
to cause serious injury or death. See State v. Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91 (1978), in which
Justice Parrino said in his concurring opinion: "Appellant specifically testified that he did
not intend to shoot or kill the victim or his companion. This state of mind rebutted rather
than supported the theory that he was acting in self-defense." Id. at 100. The Committee
Comment to § 2901.22 (A) equated "purposely" with "willfully." Perhaps one could argue
that in order for the state to show the death was caused "willfully" it would have to prove
that the act was not done in self-defense.
21a Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 Committee Comment (Page 1975). The legislature
also stated: "Although the case law is not entirely clear, the apparent rule is that even if
the statute fails to specify any degree of culpable mental state, strict criminal liability will
not be applied unless the statute plainly indicates that the legislature intended to impose
strict liability." Id. But see State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976),
in which the Court stated, concerning criminal conspiracy:
if, under the circumstances, it might be reasonably expected that the victim's life
would be endangered by the manner and means of performing the criminal act con-
spired, each one engaged in the common design is bound by the consequences naturally
or probably arising in its furtherance and, in case of death, would be guilty of homicide.
Id. at 61, 358 N.E.2d at 1071-72. While this wording seems to exclude consideration of a
guilty state of mind, the court had already found that the defendant had a guilty state of
mind and was only considering for what consequences she should be held liable.
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act and this requirement has not been specifically abrogated by statute. 1 '
While the fact would seem irrelevant because of the Ohio Supreme Court's
explicit determination that in this state all crimes are statutory and that
there are no common law crimes or common law procedure in Ohio,21 com-
mon law is still important in filling many of the gaps left in the criminal
statutory scheme. In the recent case of State v. Humphries,21" the Supreme
Court of Ohio determined that the burden of persuasion as to lack of in-
sanity was placed on the state. Justice Locher stated in his concurring opinion:
"The General Assembly has the power to enact laws which modify or abro-
gate the common law .... However, the intention to modify or abrogate
the common law must be manifested by express language of the statute.
Abrogation of the common law by implication is not permitted, Smith v.
United Properties, Inc."2 7 Since murder at common law was an "unlawful"
act, it is submitted here that under the rule of statutory construction set forth
by Justice Locher above, it would be impossible to exclude "unlawfulness"
as an element of the crime except by explicit language in the murder statute.
Yet, it is foolhardy to suggest that the legislature could either constitutionally
or logically define murder as being a "lawful" act. 1" Therefore, "unlawful-
ness" must be viewed as an element of murder.
A third theory for reading the element of "unlawfulness" into the Ohio
murder statute gains support from the Ohio Constitution, article IV, section
20 and the case law construing the effect of that provision. This section
states: "The style of all process shall be, 'The State of Ohio'; all prosecutions
shall be carried on, in the name, and by the authority, of the State of Ohio;
and all indictments shall conclude, 'against the peace and dignity of the
State of Ohio.' "2" The question arises whether, since a crime must be
"against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio," this wording becomes
an element of the crime for Mullaney purposes. If the requirement is merely
formalistic, it lends nothing to this analysis. However, if the fact that an
214 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 693; W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 9, § 867, at
528; 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 21 (1900), at which it is stated: "to constitute a crime
against human laws there must be first a vicious will and second, an unlawful act consequent
upon such vicious will."
215 State v. Sales Book Co., 176 Ohio St. 482, 486, 200 N.E.2d 590, 594 (1964); State v.
Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 32, 1 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1936); State v. Schultz, 96 Ohio St.
114, 118, 117 N.E. 30, 31 (1917).
216 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977). See notes 116-17 and accompanying text
supra.
217 Id. at 110, 364 N.E.2d at 1363. This requirement is identical to that recognized by the
legislature as a prerequisite to finding that a statute imposes strict liability. See note 213 supra.
218 One suggestion is that the legislature could define murder to include a presumption of
"unlawfulness," freeing the prosecution of the burden of persuasion on the issue, but the
presumption would be subject to heavy scrutiny in light of Leary v. United States and
Mullaney. See notes 236-38 and accompanying text infra.
2 1 9
OHO CONST. art. lV, § 20.
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act was committed against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio is
an essential element of the crime, then the prosecution must bear the
burden of persuasion on the issue since it must prove every essential element
of the crime charged in the indictment."'
In Hamilton v. Alvis,2" ' a case involving a defendant who was charged
in an indictment for larceny which he alleged was defective in form, the
court was forced to examine the question whether an averment of unlaw-
fulness was also required to be stated in the indictment. The court found
that "[t]he indictment concludes with the allegation that the criminal acts
described were 'contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and
provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.' This is
a clear allegation that the acts were unlawful." '222 If the state, in proving
the allegedly criminal act was against the peace and dignity of the state
of Ohio, must prove an act to be unlawful, then it must prove that the
defendant did not commit the act in self-defense so as to justify his actions.
In this case, the requirements for the form of the criminal indictment sug-
gest that an additional element of "unlawfulness" must be read into the
murder statute.
Other constitutional provisions from both the Ohio Constitution and
the federal Constitution support the proposition that "unlawfulness" should
be read as an element in the murder statute.22 Article 1, section 1, of the
Ohio Constitution provides in part: "All men are, by nature, free and
independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and ... obtaining. . . safety."22 ' Thus, the
state legislature can neither explicitly nor implicitly remove the right of a
person to defend himself and a statute which leaves no room for assertion
of the right would be clearly unconstitutional if so applied. Arguably, the
220 OHIo R. CRIM. P. 7 (B); 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 403.10a (Provis. 1974), which
requires the standard jury instruction for burden of proof to be stated as follows:
The defendant(s) is (are) presumed innocent until his (their) guilt is established beyond
a reasonable doubt. The defendant(s) must be acquitted unless the state produces
evidence which convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element
of the crime(s) charged in the indictment (information) (or of any lesser offense
included within that charge).
221 109 Ohio App. 298, 160 N.E.2d 372 (Franklin County 1959).
222Id. at 301, 160 N.E.2d at 374. The reasoning of the Court also indicates that "against
the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio" is not a mere formalistic requirement since the
words have content reaching beyond the language involved.
223 That the Courts have the obligation to construe statutes in accordance with the presumed
legislative intention that the statute be constitutional was supported by State v. Nieto, 101
Ohio St. 409, 423, 130 N.E. 663, 667 (1920) (dissenting opinion). Ohio courts have been
required in the past to develop their own construction of a statute in order to bring it into
conformity with constitutional requirements. See, e.g., State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22,
179 N.E.2d 777 (1962), rev'd, 378 U.S. 184 (1963).
224 OHIO CONST., art. I, § 1.
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reading of article I, section 4, supports the same conclusion, since it guar-
antees the people "the right to bear arms for their defense and security
... ," although the question remains whether the framers intended to protect
the bearing of arms only for the common defense or whether they intended
the protection to extend to the individual's self protection.22 It might even
be argued that the right to defend one's self is supported by article 1,
section 20, of the Ohio Constitution, that "this enumeration of rights shall
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people,"22 since
the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the right of self-defense even with-
out reference to a specific provision of the Ohio constitution. 27
The federal Constitution also precludes criminalizing and punishing an
act done in self-defense and, thus, requires "unlawfulness" to be read into
the Ohio murder statute as an element of the crime. The Mullaney majority
recognized that since the sixteenth century, a homicide resulting from an
act done in self-defense was justifiable and not unlawful. 2 8 This fact in-
dicates that the right of self-defense should be classified as a right "so
rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental" and given the protection of the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. ' The right has been recognized by earlier federal
case law, lending support to this proposition. In Beard v. United States," '°
where the Supreme Court held that a defendant who had been confronted
on his property by a threatening, armed assailant was under no duty to
flee the danger, the Court went through a lengthy analysis of the common
law and American authorities stating that self-defense was a justification for
an otherwise unlawful act." 1 It can be argued that if a state were not pre-
cluded by the fourteenth amendment from deeming an act done in self-
225 Omo CONST., art. I, § 4. See State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 218, 58 N.E. 572, 575
(1900), in which the court stated that the constitutional right is for the "defense of self
and property ... [which] secures to him a right of which he cannot be deprived," indicating
that this is an individual right, and not a right existing only when the general citizenry is
in danger.
226 OHIO CONST., art. I § 20.
227 See State v. Nieto, 101 Ohio St. 409, 415, 130 N.E. 663, 664 (1920), in which the court
recognized the "rights of an individual to defend his person against death or great bodily
harm within his house." See also text accompanying notes 200-202 supra.
228 421 U.S. at 692.
221 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) in which Justice Goldberg, concurring, argued that Snyder supported
the proposition advanced in the ninth amendment, that fundamental rights could not be
limited to those rights listed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 493.
230 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
231 Id. at 562-63. See also United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 787 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 1866)
(No. 16, 151) where it was stated: "Where crime is committed with impunity . .. those
unprotected by other sanctions .. . [are required] . . . to rely upon physical force for the
vindication of their natural rights. There is no other remedy and no other security."
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defense a crime, the state could require an innocent person seeking to obey
the law to submit to death or serious harm rather than injure the assailant
by acting in self-defense." 2 While the logic of this argument is forceful,
however, until this time the Supreme Court has never had the occasion
to decide whether the right of self-defense is a fundamental right.
While there are many practical and constitutional arguments for
reading "unlawfulness" into the murder statute, it is important to note that the
first time the Ohio Supreme Court considered the question of burden al-
location when self-defense was in issue, it created a judicial presumption
of unlawfulness in the statute. In Silvus v. State,"' counsel for the defendant
had argued that the state must prove the killing to be unlawful and that
if it was done in self-defense, it was not unlawful.2"' The court found
that the burden of showing unlawfulness could not be placed on the prose-
cution because this placement of the burden would "destroy the presump-
tions arising from the homicide." 3 ' The court, in determining that a pre-
sumption of unlawfulness arose once the killing by the defendant was estab-
lished, would have brought the case squarely within the reins of Leary v.
United States. 6 if the presumption were relied upon today.
The United States Supreme Court, in Leary, had noted that a statutory
presumption would be struck down "unless it can at least be said with
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."2 Mullaney
indicated that the standard may be much greater in the circumstance where
presuming the existence of a fact shifts the burden of persuasion on that
fact to the defendant since "the Due Process Clause demands more exacting
standards before the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate
burden of persuasion."3 8 The test of whether the presumed fact follows
2 2 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.47 (Page 1975), which states: "In enacting a statute, it
is presumed that . . . (C) A just and reasonable result is intended." A statute stating that
an innocent person could not use self-defense in his protection would be irreconcilable with
the just and reasonable intentions of the legislature since the legislature would require the
person to submit voluntarily to death though able to protect himself.
23 22 Ohio St. 90 (1871).
234 Id. at 92.
235 Id. at 99. The presumption of unlawfulness was discussed from the standpoint of a pre-
sumption of malice, indicating that the court found malice and unlawfulness interchangeable
concepts. This is consistent with other Ohio cases which have considered the two terms.
See note 207 and accompanying text supra.
236 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
28 Id. at 36. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843, 846 (1973) in which it is
suggested that the proven fact may need to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the presumed
fact exists.
238 421 U.S. 703 n.31.
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from the evidence, according to Barnes v. United States,2"9 is whether the
presumption meets with "common sense and experience." In light of the
Model Penal Code's assertion that given the fact of an intentional homicide,
"no one can estimate the probability it was or was not committed in self-
defense," it may be constitutionally impermissible for the courts to presume
that the element of unlawfulness exists in the Ohio murder statute if the
effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant." '
Whether an Ohio court could rely upon Silvus for the proposition that
it is possible to read an element of unlawfulness into the murder statute
then becomes a question of whether the Ohio Supreme Court would have
adopted such a posture if it could not have shifted the burden of persuasion
as to self-defense to the defendant under Leary or Mullaney. If the court
would have implied the element of unlawfulness without respect to the
eventual burden allocation, Silvus supports the proposition that the element
should be read into the present statute to rest the burden of persuasion on
the prosecution to prove that the killing occurred unlawfully.
Even if the element of unlawfulness is not read into the Ohio murder
statute, another plausible argument exists for resting the burden of per-
suasion on the prosecution to show lack of self-defense. In the General
Provisions of the Ohio Criminal Code, the Ohio Legislature has provided
that: "a person is not guilty of an offense unless ... [h]is liability is based
on conduct which includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform
an act or duty which he is capable of performing .... "41 Because the
legislature has indicated that the General Provisions chapter is to apply to
the criminal law in general, ' the prosecution is required to prove that, in
addition to the elements of any crime specifically set forth the criminal act
in question was done voluntarily. If such voluntariness would preclude im-
position of liability for an act done in self-defense, i.e., if self-defense makes
an act involuntary under the code, then the burden of persuasion cannot be
shifted to the defendant. The legislature defines "involuntary acts" by
presenting examples, among which are "[r]eflexes, convulsions, body move-
ments during unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not
otherwise a product of the actor's volition .... "24
Although one can argue that self-defense is not used willingly by the
actor who utilizes it to protect himself, it is difficult to classify self-defense
as the type of "reflexive" action which the legislature intended to exclude
239 412 U.S. at 845.
240 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
241 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(A) (1) (Page 1975).
242 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01-2901.45, Committee Comment (Page 1975).
?43 QHio REv. CODE ANN, § 2901.21(C) (2) (Page 1975).
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from liability.""4 A second problem is that if self-defense is recognized as
an involuntary act within the meaning of the code, then the analysis of
burden-shifting applicable to that defense may also be applicable to other
defenses for which the actor does not have "the ability to refrain from doing
that act," such as insanity."4 5 This would mean that the state would face
the problem of proving that a defendant is sane in opposition to an over-
whelming judicial reluctance to do so. ' The second problem can be dim-
inished by dividing cases of involuntariness into two separate categories:
those where one is unable to understand the nature of his act or conform to
lawful conduct, as in insanity, and those where although one is able to
understand his act, he must attempt to conform his act to law in the face
of external pressure, i.e., where one is moved by duress or necessity, or
acts in self-defense. However, the first problem, that of classifying self-de-
fense as an involuntary act, still constitutes the most formidable barrier
to placing the burden of persuasion on the prosecution under the theory
that the element of "voluntariness" can be read into the murder statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The propriety of reading the element of unlawfulness into the Ohio
murder statute is founded on an analysis of Mullaney and Patterson which
indicates that burden allocation relies upon a test much wider in scope
than the narrow "elements" approach suggested by Winship. Had the Mul-
laney Court been concerned only with forcing the defendant to bear the
burden of persuasion on those facts of the crime which were statutorily
defined as elements of the crime, then the Mullaney Court could have con-
cluded that the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion. The Court, however, went beyond form
to reach the substance of the crime involved. It found that the burden
was improperly placed on the defendant after a review of objective history
and the subjective interests of the defendant and the state.
Mullaney, on its face did not conclude that the culpability factor in-
volved in that case was an element of the crime, although the Supreme
Court in Patterson determined that Mullaney stood for that conclusion. When
244 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 9, § 25, at 179 n.22, where the authors speak
of a voluntary act as one that "must be willed." This adds no clarification to the problem,
however, since "will" can be used in the narrow sense to mean non-reflexive action, as well
as in the broader sense to mean "desired" action. The act of self-defense seems similar to
LaFave and Scott's example of a person who finds himself falling and reaches out to grab
an object to prevent the fall. The act is viewed as voluntary, according to the authors, since
the person's "mind has quickly grasped the situation and dictated some action." Id. at 181.
245 See State v. Jackson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 203, 291 N.E.2d 432 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
909 (1973).
246 State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (Celebrezze, J., con-
curring). See also notes 99-120 and accompanying text supra.
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the Supreme Court differentiated the New York mitigation factor from the
heat of passion defense in Mullaney, it did so by concluding that Mullaney
had been decided on the basis of a wide elements approach. Patterson, thus,
supports the view that the balancing approach used in Mullaney should be
applied when determining whether a fact of the crime should also be an
element of that crime.
In view of these cases, statutorily defined elements play a subordinate
role to the real interests at stake. Even if the legislature determines the
elements of the offense with which an individual will be charged in the
complaint, as it would under Senate Bill Number 42, the judiciary possesses
the power to recognize other elements of the offense which the legislature
had not specifically defined. If an affirmative defense relates to one of these
statutorily undefined elements, then the prosecution must also bear the
burden of proving those elements and negating the facts constituting the
defense. This places the practical burden on the legislature prior to the
enactment of a criminal statute, to consider every fact for which the burden
of persuasion may possibly rest on the defendant and to make an inde-
pendent determination of the relative interests involved, state and individual.
It must weigh each and conclude in light of these interests on whom the
burden of persuasion can be placed without violating the Due Process
Clause. The opportunity for error is great because the test is necessarily
one of inexactitude.
While a number of arguments are available to support the proposition
that unlawfulness should be read into the Ohio murder statute because of
the interests involved, no argument is free from question by those claiming
that the state's interest in having the defendant bear the burden of proof on
the issue of self-defense (as well as on the issues involved in other affirmative
defenses) is paramount. Just as the Patterson Court found that the state's
interest in placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant to slhow severe
emotional distress was too great to leave on the state, so, too, may the
courts in Ohio find that such a compelling interest requires the defendant
to bear the burden of persuasion on a number of issues in this state. It is
submitted here only that, with respect to self-defense, the interests seem
to weigh heavily in favor of placing the burden of persuasion on the state
to prove that the defendant did not act in protection of his life.
RANDY R. KOENDERS*
* The author wishes to thank Margery Koosed and Richard Aynes for their assistance in
providing resourcc m at~rials for the content of this comment.
[Vol. 11:4
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss4/7
